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The Container Security Initiative:
Balancing U.S. Security Interests with the




In response to the September 11th terrorist attacks, the
United States Customs Service (Customs) implemented the
Container Security Initiative (CSI).1 The CSI is a partnership
program where Customs agents are given access to and are sta-
tioned at seaports of foreign nations. 2 The CSI allows Customs
to coordinate efforts with its foreign counterparts to conduct
safety inspections of export products headed for the United
States. 3 Customs developed the CSI because U.S. seaports are
ideal targets for terrorism. 4 This is so primarily because sea-
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of Chicago. The Author dedicates this article to her grandmother, Mrs. Soon Y.
Jung. The Author gives special thanks to her parents, Mr. Gi B. Lee and Mrs. Yong
C. Lee, and to her brother Chun T. Lee.
1. See, e.g., HM Customs & US Customs Agree Container Security Initiative,
M2 PRESSWIRE, Dec. 9, 2002, available at 2002 WL 103728017 [hereinafter HM Cus-
toms]. The CSI is designed to provide Customs with intelligence information con-
cerning sea cargoes headed for the United States. See id. This information in turn
allows Customs to target the cargoes that could contain terrorist weapons of mass
destruction. See id.
2. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Frequently Asked Questions
(FAQs) about CSI, at http://www.customs.ustreas.govxp/cgov/enforcement/
interntionalactivitiescsiqand a.xml (last visited Oct. 30, 2003).
3. See, e.g., EU: U.S. Port Security Drive Breaks EU Law-Commission,
MACON TELEGRAPH, Dec. 20, 2002, available at http://www.macon.com/mld/macon/
news/politics/4783204.htm [hereinafter Breaks EU Laws] (stating that under this
system, the Customs officers and the local inspectors work together).
4. See infra notes 17-41 and accompanying text. See also U.S.-European Offi-
cials Meet on Cargo Security; Port Bill Approved, INSIDE THE PENTAGON, Nov. 21,
2002, available at 2002 WL 20490862 [hereinafter Officials Meet on Cargo Security]
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ports are vital links to the world economy, security at U.S. sea-
ports is almost non-existent, and the majority of the cargo con-
tainers entering the United States through the seaports are not
subjected to security inspection. 5 A terrorist attack at a major
U.S. seaport would essentially halt international trade and dev-
astate the world economy. 6
So far, Customs has signed CSI agreements with eighteen
nations, 7 including eight member states of the European Union
(EU): the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, the United
Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and Sweden.8 However, the legitimacy
of these agreements is in question because they conflict with EU
law.9 The EU is a political organization of fifteen nations 10 that
carries out external relations with non-member nations on be-
half of its member nations.1 1 The EU maintains that, under its
laws, the United States should have entered into a CSI agree-
ment with the EU, rather than the individual nations. 12 If the
("Everyone agrees that international shipping containers are a potential delivery
means for weapons of mass destruction.").
5. See infra notes 20-41 and accompanying text.
6. See Paul Ames, Container Bomb Could Push World Trade Back to "Stone
Age," Customs Group Warns, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRE, June 27, 2003, avail-
able at LEXIS, News Library, Wire News Services File.
7. Press Release, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Republic of Korea
Implements Container Security Initiative to Begin Targeting and Pre-Screening
Cargo Destined for U.S. (Aug. 04, 2003), available at http://www.customs.ustreas.
gov/xp/cgov/newsroompress.releases/08042003.xml.
8. See, e.g., EU/United States-Council Grants Commission Negotiating Brief
on Transport Security, EUROPEAN REP., Mar. 22, 2003, available at 2003 WL
10439733; Containers-Spain Signs Up to Port Security Initiative, LLOYD'S LIST
INT'L, Jan. 10, 2003, available at 2003 WL 3047668 [hereinafter Containers-Spain
Signs Up]. The Netherlands, France, Belgium, and Germany were the first Euro-
pean nations to sign the CSI agreement with the United States. Roger Hailey,
Brussels Seeks Consensus on Regulations, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Sept. 10, 2002, avail-
able at 2002 WL 26528408. Italy and Britain followed. See HM Customs, supra note
1. Lastly, Spain and Sweden became the seventh and eighth European nations to
agree. See Containers-Spain Signs Up, supra; see also PORTS WORLD, EC Legal
Action Brings into Question Status of US Initiative, Bus. TIMES (Malay.), Jan. 6,
2003, available at 2003 WL 2845984 (indicating that the UK and Italian CSI agree-
ments stipulate that "any provisions" of their agreements will be trumped by a sub-
sequent agreement between the European Community and the United States).
9. See discussion infra Parts II-III.
10. The EU is also referred to as the European Community. See, e.g., infra
notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 122-130 and accompanying text.
12. See Breaks EU Laws, supra note 3 (stating that the individual agreements
"break laws on creating a single EU market by giving some ports competitive advan-
tage in traffic to the United States"); see also EU Starts Case Vs States With Port
Security Pacts With US, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS, Dec. 20, 2002 (on file with author)
(explaining that the Commission believes that a general agreement between the EU
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EU alone has the power to enter into such an agreement, then
the eight CSI agreements violate EU law and may be invali-
dated by the EU.
Part I of this Note examines the CSI program in detail, em-
phasizing the reasons for which maritime trade is a target for
terrorist acts and the solution provided by the program. Part II
analyzes EU membership and its rules and laws that may pro-
hibit individual states from entering into CSI agreements with
the United States. Part III argues that the individual states
violated EU laws by signing the CSI. Part IV explores the bal-
ance between U.S. security and EU interests, and provides
workable solutions that meet the needs of the United States and
the EU.
I. THE CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE
A. MARITIME TRADE IS VULNERABLE TO ACTS OF TERRORISM
Following September 11th, 13 national security became the
top priority for Customs. 14 Immediately after the attacks, Cus-
toms went on alert and increased security at all U.S. borders. 15
and the United States provides a more effective fight against terrorism than indi-
vidual agreements). But see Press Release, State Department, Custom's Bonner Re-
acts to the EC Container Security Stance-The Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and
France Cited by EC, (Dec. 23, 2002), available at 2002 WL 104129413 (denying that
the CSI causes trade distortions).
13. On September 11, 2001 Al Qaeda launched a massive terrorist attack on
the United States. See, e.g., September 11: A Memorial, CNN.cOM: IN-DEPTH
SPECIAL, at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/memorial (last visited Sept. 12,
2003). Al Qaeda members hijacked four American commercial airplanes and flew
two into the World Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon in
Washington, D.C., and one into a field in Pennsylvania. Id. As a result of this
incident, more than 3,000 people died. Id.
14. Robert C. Bonner, Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (Aug. 26, 2002), available at http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/xp/
cgov/newsroomcommissioner/speeches.statements/aug262002.xml. [hereinafter
Bonner's August Speech] (indicating that the Customs "increased security at...
[the] borders, and implemented the Container Security Initiative (CSI), the Cus-
toms-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), Operation Green Quest, a
Customs-led multi-agency task force to investigate and attack terrorist financing, as
well as other counterterrorism initiatives").
15. Robert C. Bonner, Speech Before the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (Jan. 17, 2002), available at http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/xp/cgov/ news-
room/commissioner/speeches statements/archivesjan172002.xml. [hereinafter Bon-
ner's January Speech] ("Immediately following the terrorist attacks on September
11th, at about 10:05 a.m. on September 11, Customs went to a Level 1 alert across
the country at all border entry points. Level 1 requires sustained, intensive anti-
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE [Vol. 13:1
In particular, Customs concentrated its efforts on safeguarding
U.S. seaports. 16 It was feared that seaports were ideal targets
for terrorist attacks 17 for two reasons: first, seaports play a ma-
jor role in global trade;' 8 and second, seaport security is almost
nonexistent. 19
Seaports are extremely important to global trade because
approximately ninety percent of the world's cargo moves by
ocean-going sea containers. 20 This accounts for over 200 million
sea containers that move between major seaports annually. 2 1
The United States receives about forty-six percent of its trade
imports by containers. 22 Although forty-six percent may not
seem significant, in 2001 alone more than 214,000 vessels and
5.7 million sea containers entered the 102 U.S. seaports. 23 Fur-
thermore, whereas the United States relies on its land-
bordering NAFTA partners for a significant amount of trade, 24
there are many nations such as the United Kingdom that rely
terrorist questioning, and includes increased inspections of travelers and goods at
every port of entry").
16. See id.; see also infra notes 17-41 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Securing Our Ports Against Terror: Technology, Resources, and
Homeland Defense: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism, and
Government Information of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 2 (2002)
[hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein, Member,
Comm. on the Judiciary).
18. See Officials Meet on Cargo Security, supra note 4 (noting that "interna-
tional shipping containers are the foundation of global trade on which all of our
prosperity depends").
19. See Senate Hearing, supra note 17, at 31 (statement of Amanda Debusk,
former Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement, Department of Commerce, and
former Commissioner, Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Sea-
ports) (pointing out that port security "ranges from poor to fair"); infra note 34 and
accompanying text.
20. Press Release, U.S. Customs, U.S. Customs Container Security Initiative
Forging Ahead, 2002 Archived Press Releases (Aug. 8, 2002), available at
http://www.customs.ustreas.govlhot-new/pressrel/2002/0808-OO.htm. [hereinafter
Forging Ahead]. Sea containers, which were invented by Malcolm McLean in the
1930s, have revolutionized the cargo shipping industry as well as global trade. See
Bonner's January Speech, supra note 15. Sea containers are large steel boxes that
facilitate loading and unloading cargo from ships. See, Rosella Breretti, Bonner
Says Customs Is Making Container Security Initiative a Reality, 19 INT'L TRADE REP.
12, 484 (2002) (explaining that transport ships are able to stack dozens of stories of
cargo containers).
21. See, e.g., Forging Ahead, supra note 20.
22. Bonner's August Speech, supra note 14.
23. E.g., Forging Ahead, supra note 20.
24. See Bonner's January Speech, supra note 15. The United States receives
thirty-one percent of its trade goods by truck and rail from its NAFTA partners-
Canada and Mexico. Id. In addition, air cargo accounts for the remaining twenty-
three percent. Id.
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almost exclusively on sea container trade.25 Therefore, seaports
are a critical part of the world's economic activity. 26
Terrorists prey not only on lives, but also on the economy.
Because seaports play such an important role in global trade,
there is no doubt that the U.S. and the world economies will suf-
fer if terrorists launch a successful attack on a U.S. seaport.27
The September l1th attacks reflect the extent of the possible
economic damage. Following September 1lth, the airline indus-
try halted for almost a week and cost the U.S. economy billions
of dollars. 28 In the case of maritime trade, Customs would have
to shut it down for much longer than a week while the govern-
ment developed a secure solution. 29 Yet, even after reopening,
seaports would have to process the cargoes of ships that were
unable to enter the ports during the shutdown period.30 Billions
would be lost in the United States alone, especially in the cities
that depend on seaports for business.3 1 Since the majority of
globally traded goods exchange hands at seaports, seaports
make very attractive targets for terrorists. 32
25. See id. Nations such as the Netherlands, Singapore, Japan, and South Ko-
rea carry out the majority of their trade through sea transport. Id. For example,
South Korea conducts approximately 99.7% of its trade through its seaports. See
Seung-Kuk Palik & Prabir K. Bagchi, Process Reengineering in Port Operations: A
Case Study, 11 INT'L J. LOGISTICS MGMT. 59, 59 (2000).
26. See, e.g., Senate Hearing, supra note 17, at 1 (statement of U.S. Senator
Dianne Feinstein, Member, Comm. on the Judiciary).
27. See Gary Fields, The War on Terror: U.S. Tests Terror Preparedness And
Finds Economic Catastrophe, WALL ST. J. EUR., Dec. 5, 2002, available at 2002 WL-
WSJE 103489846 (indicating that a terrorist attack would "shut down the world
economy"); Bonner's January Speech, supra note 15 ("One can only imagine the dev-
astation of a small nuclear explosion at one of our seaports.... [t]he shipping of sea
containers would stop. The American people, for one, would not likely permit one
more sea container to enter the United States ... ").
28. See Bonner's January Speech, supra note 15.
29. See id.
30. See Fields, supra note 27.
31. See Bonner's January Speech, supra note 15; see also Fields, supra note 27
(predicting $58 billion in losses: the Dow Jones Industrial average would drop by
about 500 points; gas prices would skyrocket because supplies would be cut by the
port closures; manufacturing industries would suffer due to the lack of inventory;
and factories would close).
32. See Senate Hearing, supra note 17, at 2 (statement of U.S. Senator Dianne
Feinstein, Member, Comm. on the Judiciary); Don Walsh, Seaport Security: The Im-
possible Dream?, U.S. NAVAL INT. PROC., Feb. 2002, at 89 (noting that the vast
amount of economic and industrial activities taking place at the seaports makes
them ideal targets); see also U.S. Transportation Department's Inspector General
Looks at Seaport Security, THE CANADIAN PRESS, Feb. 11, 2002, available at 2002
WL 13837506 [hereinafter U.S. Transportation Department's Inspector General]
(noting that in some areas seaports are close to industrial sites such as "nuclear
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Lack of security at U.S. seaports is another factor that
makes them easy targets for terrorism. There are two major de-
ficiencies in seaport security. First, federal agencies do not
regulate U.S. seaports. 33 In the absence of such regulation, an
inspection by the Seaports Commission reported that the "state
of security at seaports generally ranged from poor to fair, with a
few exceptions where the security was good."34 Additionally, ac-
cess at many seaports is uncontrolled, and unauthorized vehi-
cles can park easily beside docked vessels.35 With such uncon-
trolled access, there is always "the possibility that a car bomb or
a dirty nuclear weapon could be hidden in those vehicles." 36
power plants, chemical plants, [and] oil refineries").
33. See Senate Hearing, supra note 17, at 2 (statement of U.S. Senator Dianne
Feinstein, Member, Comm. on the Judiciary) ("No Federal agency currently has
comprehensive authority to regulate activity at seaports."); see also Henry L. Hinton,
Jr., Combating Terrorism, FED. DOc. CLEARING HOUSE, Mar. 12, 2002, available at
2002 WL 25100039 (explaining that since September 11th, various federal agencies
and Congress are working to improve security at the seaports); Charles Lunan, Cus-
toms Service Plan Could Prevent Arms Smuggling, But Costs Will Hit Importers,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 8, 2002, available at 2002 WL 26639896 (noting that
the federal government has granted $93 million to the seaports to increase security);
Jonathan Peterson, INS, Customs May Join Forces Under Bush Plan, WICHITA
EAGLE, Mar. 20, 2002, available at 2002 WL 15660019 (indicating that President
Bush proposes combining the INS and Customs to better protect the ports of entry).
But see Port Authority; Legislation to Tighten Security Lagging in Congress, STATE
JOURNAL-REGISTER (Springfield, Ill.), Jan. 13, 2002, available at 2002 WL 9741994
[hereinafter Port Authority] (explaining that some port officials are concerned that
too much federal control may not be effective because ports will have their own local
needs of which the federal government may not be aware).
34. Senate Hearing, supra note 17, at 31 (statement of Amanda Debusk, former
Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement, Department of Commerce, and former
Commissioner, Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports). A
notable example of the lax security is that many U.S. seaports do not restrict the
carrying of firearms. See Port Authority, supra note 33. This is in contrast to air-
ports where any sharp objects, including nail clippers, are prohibited past the secu-
rity gates. See id. (noting the large disparity between the level of seaport and air-
port security).
35. See Senate Hearing, supra note 17, at 32 (statement of Amanda Debusk,
former Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement, Department of Commerce, and
former Commissioner, Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Sea-
ports).
36. Id.; "Dirty Bomb" Has Low Radiation Risk, THE BATON ROUGE ADVOC.,
June 26, 2002, available at 2002 WL 5037824 (explaining that Federal authorities
suspect that terrorists will attempt to use dirty bombs against the United States);
US, Russia, IAEA to Sponsor Vienna Conference on "Dirty Bombs" Officials,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Nov. 14, 2002, available at 2002 WL 23648874 (noting
that authorities discovered "detailed instructions on how to make dirty bombs ... in
al-Qaeda caves [in Afghanistan]"). A dirty bomb is a device containing low-grade
materials, such as nuclear waste. See Brian Handwerk, Nuclear Terrorism-How
Great is the Threat?, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, Oct. 11, 2002, available at
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Furthermore, the Seaports Commission has made a set of rec-
ommendations for basic safety standards; these recommenda-
tions shed more light on current conditions: "[M]inimum physi-
cal security standards covering fences, lights, gates, restrictions
on vehicle access, restrictions on carrying firearms, the estab-
lishment of a credentialing process, considering criminal back-
ground checks for those with access to sensitive areas of the
port, and development of a private security officer certification
program." 37  Thus, in the absence of federal regulations and
safety guidelines, U.S. seaports have poor security and are in-
adequately safeguarded.
Second, Customs agents are unaware of the contents of sea
containers arriving at U.S. seaports from overseas.
Due to short staffing and limited technology, inspectors today look at
only one or two percent of containers; ninety-eight to ninety-nine per-
cent are just waived through. Hence, virtually every time a ship
docks, the only people who know what is in a container are the people
who shipped it, maybe, and the people picking it up, maybe. 38
As a result of this system, there is significant criminal activity
at most of the twelve major U.S. seaports, including "[d]rug traf-
ficking, alien smuggling, [and] export of stolen automobiles."39
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2002/1O/lO11_021011_nuclear.html; Mi-
guel Navrot, Tests Held at KAFB to Find "Dirty Bomb", ALBUQUERQUE J., Aug. 27,
2002, available at 2002 WL 25979259. They will usually be made using low-grade
isotopes that are often used in hospitals, medicine, and research. See H. Josef
Hebert, "Dirty Bomb" a weapon of Mass Destruction: "Impact More Psychological
Than Loss of Life'" TORONTO STAR, June 11, 2002, available at 2002 WL 21223761.
Chances are dirty bombs will not contain enriched uranium or plutonium because
such materials are extremely difficult to obtain. See id. Thus, dirty bombs will not
have an atomic chain reaction or be highly radioactive as are conventional nuclear
bombs. See id. Therefore, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission believes that
the detonation of a dirty bomb would release limited radiation that would be isolated
to the area of the explosion. Id.
37. Senate Hearing, supra note 17, at 31 (statement of Amanda Debusk, former
Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement, Department of Commerce, and former
Commissioner, Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports).
38. Id. at 2 (statement of U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein, Member, Comm. on
the Judiciary). See U.S. Transportation Department's Inspector General, supra note
32 (noting that despite the fact that maritime trade will double by the year 2020,
Customs only inspects two percent of the containers); see also Port Authority, supra
note 33 (noting, "agents at the Mexican border near Tijuana will tear the seats out of
a car to search for drugs, while a crane just up the coast in Los Angeles lifts thou-
sands of truck-sized cargo containers onto the dock with no inspection").
39. Senate Hearing, supra note 17, at 2 (statement of U.S. Senator Dianne
Feinstein, Member, Comm. on the Judiciary); see Walsh, supra note 32 (noting that
seaport security issues include illegal immigration, organized crime, and smuggling
of drugs).
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Of more concern, Italian authorities found Amir Farid Rizk, a
suspected Al Qaeda member, in a container headed for Can-
ada.40 Given this incident, it is possible that other terrorists en-
tered North America in sea containers. 41 Because sea containers
are susceptible to tampering and Customs allows entry to most
sea containers without inspecting their contents, U.S. seaports
are vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
B. CUSTOMS' INSPECTION SYSTEM
Customs defends its low inspection rate stating that it must
necessarily strike a balance between national security interests
and efficient trade. 42 It is impossible to inspect every container
that enters the United States because such a system would
cripple the flow of trade. 43 If Customs inspected one hundred
percent of its containers, "the ports would be backed up all the
way from Los Angeles to Tokyo or New York to London."44 Ac-
cording to some estimates, if Customs had to conduct the same
type of security search that the airlines conducted following
September 11th, checking all the cargoes entering U.S. seaports
would take up to four months. 45 This procedure certainly would
require shutting down maritime trade for the entire four-month
period.46
40. See Lunan, supra note 33. The contents of the cargo showed that Rizk was
well prepared for his three-week trip: a bed, toilet, portable heater, and water. See
Senate Hearing, supra note 17, at 2 (statement of U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein,
Member, Comm. on the Judiciary). Additionally, he had a Canadian passport, global
satellite phone, cell phone, laptop computer, cameras, identification papers, airport
maps, an airline mechanic's certificate, and security passes for airports in Canada,
Thailand, and Egypt. Id.
41. See Senate Hearing, supra note 17, at 2 (statement of U.S. Senator Dianne
Feinstein, Member, Comm. on the Judiciary). See also Lunan, supra note 33 (noting
that although Rizk denies he is a terrorist, this incident has led some officials to ad-
vocate a higher inspection rate).
42. See Prevention and Suppression of Acts of Terrorism Against Shipping:
Container Security-U.S. Customs Container Security Initiative (CSI), IMO Mari-
time Safety Committee, 75th Sess., Agenda Item 17, at 1, MSC 75/17/33 (April 12,
2002) (submitted by the United States) [hereinafter Prevention] (stating that Cus-
toms cannot inspect all cargo shipments because doing so would halt the movement
of trade).
43. Id.
44. Senate Hearing, supra note 17, at 4 (statement of U.S. Senator Charles E.
Schumer, Member, Comm. on the Judiciary).
45. Id. at 23 (statement of William G. Schubert, Maritime Administrator, U.S.
Department of Transportation). Following September 11th, authorities halted air-
line activity for four days to inspect every single plane for safety. Id. Thus, a simi-
lar procedure for ship containers would take up to ten times longer. Id.
46. Id.
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Furthermore, Customs presents a different accounting for
its two percent inspection figure. 47 Customs does not randomly
pick two percent of the cargo for inspection. 48 Rather, Customs
only examines those cargoes posing the most risk.49 This is ac-
complished by analyzing the "manifest," or declaration, of cargo
that foreign exporters submit to Customs prior to shipping their
goods to the United States. 50 Additionally, Customs Commis-
sioner Robert Bonner assures that the inspection system utilizes
strategic and tactical intelligence that incorporates information
received from the CIA.51
However, this system was not functioning efficiently be-
cause shippers did not always provide timely or complete mani-
fests to Customs. 52 Without accurate manifests, Customs was
47. See U.S. Transportation Department's Inspector General, supra note 32
(noting that more than sixty percent of the cargo is shipped by 1,000 importers with
whom the Customs agency is familiar). See also Fields, supra note 27 (noting that
since September 11th, Customs and over 1,000 companies have agreed to increase
manufacturing and shipping security in return for a faster inspection process).
48. See Bonner's January Speech, supra note 15 (expressing regret that since
September lth Customs' routine of checking two percent of the cargoes has been
under much criticism).
49. See id. In a report to the International Maritime Organization, Customs
stated:
[What has been incorrectly characterized as random selection is actually a
sophisticated risk management approach to targeting. Through this risk
management approach, which includes advance manifest and entry infor-
mation, automated data collection and targeting, and a layered screening
and examination methodology aided by non-intrusive technology, Customs
is inspecting the highest risk commercial sea cargo shipments that might
contain contraband or other products affecting the health, safety and eco-
nomic well being of our citizens and indeed the world.
Prevention, supra note 42, at 2.
50. See Senate Hearing, supra note 17, at 12 (statement of Bonni Tischler, As-
sistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs Service); Press Re-
lease, U.S. Customs, U.S. Customs to Require Advance Cargo Manifests from Sea
Carriers to Protect Global Trade (Aug. 7, 2002), available at http://www.cbp.gov/
xp/cgov/newsroompres-releases/82002/08072002.xml (noting that Customs uses
manifest information to assess terrorist risks associated with the containers headed
for the United States). A manifest is a declaration of the cargo headed for the U.S.
See U.S. Customs 24 Hour Advance Manifest Rule, NYK LINE, Nov. 26, 2002, avail-
able at http://www2.nykline.com/nykinfo/whats-new/manifestrulebot.html (describ-
ing the general requirements of the manifest rule). A cargo declaration includes the
following information: port of loading, foreign port immediately before heading for
the United States, scheduled date of arrival, shipper's identification, carrier code,
vessel number, number of containers, etc. See id.
51. Bonner's January Speech, supra note 15 (noting that intelligence is essen-
tial in the operation of Customs' multi-layered strategy to protect the United States
from terrorism).
52. See Senate Hearing, supra note 17, at 32 (statement of Amanda Debusk,
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unaware of the contents of some of the sea containers, and thus
could not assess risk properly: 53 "a container can be loaded on a
ship and be halfway across the Atlantic Ocean before anybody
gets any documentation on... what is in the container."54 In
some cases, exporters or carriers submitted cargo declarations a
week after the arrival of the shipment. 55 Not surprisingly, the
manifest system proved unreliable, as a 1999 Seaport Commis-
sion study showed a fifty-three percent discrepancy rate be-
tween the reported manifests and the cargoes actually arriving
in the United States. 56 After September 11th, it became appar-
ent to legislators and federal officials that security improve-
ments were in order.57
C. CSI INCREASES SEAPORT SECURITY WHILE PRESERVING
TRADE EFFICIENCY, BUT AT A COST
1. Increasing Security
On January 17, 2002 Customs Commissioner Bonner pro-
posed the CSI as a means to increase safety at U.S. seaports and
to increase the overall security of maritime trade.58 More spe-
cifically, the CSI seeks to facilitate information exchange among
the world's customs authorities, allow Customs to detect suspect
former Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement, Department of Commerce, and
former Commissioner, Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Sea-
ports).
53. See id. at 21 (statement of Bonni Tischler, Assistant Commissioner, Office
of Field Operations, U.S. Customs Service) (explaining that before the new regula-
tions prompted by September I1th, submission of cargo manifests prior to the depar-
ture of the vessel carrying the containers for the United States was voluntary).
54. Id. at 25 (statement of William G. Schubert, Maritime Administrator, U.S.
Department of Transportation).
55. See id. at 34 (statement of Amanda Debusk, former Assistant Secretary for
Export Enforcement, Department of Commerce, and former Commissioner, Inter-
agency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports).
56. See id. at 32 (statement of Amanda Debusk, former Assistant Secretary for
Export Enforcement, Department of Commerce, and former Commissioner, Inter-
agency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports) ("Over half of the ves-
sels had either more or fewer containers on board than were reported.").
57. See generally id.; Bonner's January Speech, supra note 15.
58. See Bonner's January Speech, supra note 15. Commissioner Bonner pro-
posed the CSI during his speech at the Center for Strategic and International Stud-
ies in Washington D.C. Id. In his original proposal, he called the CSI program
"Container Security Strategy." Id. See also U.S. Customs 24 Hour Advance Mani-
fest Rule, supra note 50 (explaining that the CSI seeks to discourage terrorists from
attempting attacks on the global trading system).
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cargo, and deter terrorists from exploiting the containerized
shipping system.5 9 Customs focuses on signing CSI agreements
with nations where "mega ports" are located. 60 Mega ports are
the largest container ports that ship the highest volume of con-
tainers to the United States,61 which account for about two
thirds of the cargo entering the United States62
Once the United States and a partner nation enter into a
CSI agreement, Customs agents are stationed at the partner na-
tion's mega port.63 Then, these agents carry out what Customs
has named the four core elements of the CSI.64 First, Customs
agents identify "high-risk" containers.6 5 Customs attempts to
identify these containers with the use of "advance information
and strategic intelligence." 66 Second, Customs agents prescreen
containers before they depart from foreign seaports for the
United States. 67 By screening the containers at foreign ports,
Customs agents are able to extend the border and better protect
the United States. 68 Third, Customs makes use of technology to
59. See US and UK Customs Improve Co-operation, M2 PRESSWIRE, June 3,
2003, available at 2002 WL 56420210.
60. See Bonner's January Speech, supra note 15; cf. U.S. Customs 24 Hour Ad-
vance Manifest Rule, supra note 50 (noting that the partnerships are designed to
"target and screen high-risk sea containers in foreign ports before they are shipped
to or through the United States").
61. See Bonner's January Speech, supra note 15.
62. See Bonner's August Speech, supra note 14 (noting that the United States
receives almost seventy percent of its containers from the top twenty mega ports).
The following are the world's major trade partner ports and their respective trade
percentages: 1. Hong Kong (9.8%), 2. Shanghai, China (5.8%), 3. Singapore (5.8%), 4.
Kaohsiung, China (5.6%), 5. Rotterdam, Netherlands (5.1%), 6. Pusan, South Korea
(5.0%), 7. Bremerhaven, Germany (4.5%), 8. Tokyo, Japan (2.8%), 9. Genoa, Italy
(2.1%), 10. Yantian, China (2.0%), 11. Antwerp, Belgium (2.0%), 12. Nagoya, Japan
(1.9%), 13. Le Havre, France (1.9%), 14. Hamburg, Germany (1.8%), 15. La Spezia,
Italy (1.7%), 16. Felixstowe, United Kingdom (1.7%), 17. Algeciras, Spain (1.6%), 18.
Kobe, Japan (1.6%), 19. Yokohama, Japan (1.5%), 20. Laem Chabang, Thailand
(1.4%). Slide Show, Top 20 Mega Ports, U.S. Customs Service, available at
http://www.export-controls.com/regional/ presentations/csi/sldOO6.htm.
63. See Bonner's August Speech, supra note 14.
64. See id. (explaining that the four elements of CSI are designed to effectively
secure global trade).
65. See id.; Press Release, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Spain Signs
Declaration of Principles to Join U.S. Customs Container Security Initiative,
Strengthening Anti-Terror Coalition (Jan. 8, 2003), available at http://www.customs.
ustreas.gov/xp/cgov/newsroomlpress-releases/012003101082003.xml (outlining the
CSI elements). "High-risk" containers are those that terrorists could have filled
with weapons or terrorists. See Bonner's August Speech, supra note 14.
66. See Bonner's August Speech, supra note 14.
67. See id.
68. Senate Hearing, supra note 17, at 11 (statement of Bonni Tischler, Assis-
tant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs Service). Pushing out
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quickly prescreen high-risk containers. 69 Customs uses technol-
ogy such as x-ray machines, gamma ray machines, and radia-
tion detection devices to detect lead-shielded materials and peo-
ple inside the containers.7 0  Such technologically enhanced
prescreens seek to maintain trade efficiency. 71 Fourth, Customs
develops secure and smart containers. 72 With smarter contain-
ers, Customs will be able to detect tampering with pre-screened
containers.7 3 Although Customs has already developed tamper-
proof seals, the smart containers serve as an additional safe-
guard. 74 Therefore, the CSI improves Customs' screening and
information gathering processes, and allows Customs to better
protect U.S. seaports and the maritime trade system from acts
of terrorism. 75
In an effort to give effect to these four elements, Customs
also implemented the 24-hour advance manifest rule (24-hour
rule) beginning on December 2, 2002.76 In order to comply with
the border refers to the expansion of the American "perimeter of security away from
our national boundaries and towards foreign points of departure." Id. This is a
strategic plan that pushes the borders outwards "in kind of a layered defense, view-
ing our border as a continuum, basically originating from the country of origin all
the way here to the United States." Id. at 17 (statement of Rear Admiral Kenneth
Venuto, Director of Operations Policy, U.S. Coast Guard). Extending the border is
also referred to as "smart borders." See Robert C. Bonner, Remarks at News Con-
ference on the Transfer of the Customs Service to the Department of Homeland Se-
curity (Nov. 21, 2002), available at 2002 WL 31619134. Smart borders make "physi-
cal border ports of entry-land borders, seaports, international airports-even more
efficient." Id. Rather than relying on the physical borders of the United States,
smart borders provide an additional layer of defense overseas. Id. Customs
achieves this by joining efforts with other nations and businesses that export to the
United States. Id.
69. Bonner's August Speech, supra note 14.
70. See id. But see U.S-European Officials Meet on Cargo Security; Port Bill
Approved, INSIDE THE PENTAGON, Nov. 21, 2002, available at 2002 W-L 20490862
[hereinafter Port Bill Approved] (noting that the most dangerous materials such as
highly enriched uranium will be difficult to detect using the radiation scanning de-
vices because such materials have "a relatively low level of radioactivity").
71. Id.
72. Bonner's August Speech, supra note 14.
73. Id.
74. Id. Electronic seals used on the containers "can relay information via satel-
lite about a container's contents, temperature, location and whether it has been
opened." According to one estimate, it could cost up to $10 billion to fit sea contain-
ers with these seals. Lunan, supra note 33.
75. See generally Bonner's August Speech, supra note 14; Prevention, supra
note 422, at 1-3.
76. FTA Issues US Customs Disruption Alert, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Dec. 2, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 26532030; U.S. Customs 24 Hour Advance Manifest Rule, su-
pra note 50. In order to facilitate exporter compliance with the 24-hour manifest
rule, a new computer software market arose for private computer companies. See
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the 24-hour rule, the party responsible for shipping a container
to the United States must file a cargo manifest with Customs
"24 hours prior to loading in the 'foreign port'."77 The manifest
must include accurate and complete information regarding the
shippers, shipment, and vessel. 78 This allows Customs officers
stationed at the foreign ports to analyze the manifest and iden-
tify the high-risk containers before they depart for the United
States. 79
Customs also initiated a program called Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) to increase the effec-
tiveness of the CSI.8 0 Through this program, businesses take
responsibility to increase security.8 1  In exchange, Customs
gives them faster clearance through seaport inspections.8 2 Cus-
toms is already familiar with the major exporters,8 3 and its goal
Manifest 24, Trade Point Systems, at http://www.tradepointsystems.com; Automated
Manifest Service, Descartes, at http://www.descartes.com/solutions/multimodal
oceanams.html. Trade Point Systems, LLC developed "Manifest 24" and Descartes
developed "Automated Manifest Service." Manifest 24, Trade Point Systems, supra;
Automated Manifest Service, supra. Both systems are web-based programs that al-
low electronic submission of shipment information. Manifest 24, supra; Automated
Manifest Service, supra. Further, Trade Point Systems promises that its software is
"error-free" and the shipper will receive an electronic notification indicating whether
Customs accepts or rejects the shipper's filing information. Manifest 24, supra.
77. U.S. Customs 24 Hour Advance Manifest Rule, supra note 50.
78. Id. (stating that the 24-hour rule requires the following information: name
of the foreign port immediately before departure for the United States, carrier code,
voyage number, scheduled date of arrival in the United States, quantity of external
packaging units in the container, the foreign port where cargo originated from, de-
scription and weight of the cargo, identification number of shipper and owner, vessel
information, foreign port where cargo is destined, hazardous materials identification
codes, container numbers, and seal numbers).
79. Jan F. Wagner, Ports-Germany Fears Costs of New US Security Measures,
LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Dec. 12, 2002, available at 2002 WL 26532498 (noting that Cus-
toms officials get a twenty-four-hour window to inspect cargoes at the foreign ports).
But see Completion of New Anti-terrorist Logistics System for International Cargo
Shipments, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 12, 2003 (on file with author) (explaining that
the CSI and the 24-hour rule may pose more security concerns because exporters
may choose to escape the CSI regulations by shipping cargoes to Canada, and mov-
ing them to the United States by truck or rail).
80. See Lunan, supra note 33.
81. Id.
82. See Maritime Priorities Reordered for the War on Terror, LLOYD'S LIST
INT'L, Mar. 10, 2003, available at 2003 WL 3050079 [hereinafter Maritime Priorities
Reordered] (noting that importers who have approved security measures in place can
receive faster clearance).
83. U.S. Transportation Department's Inspector General, supra note 32 (ex-
plaining that Customs is familiar with many of the foreign exporters responsible for
sixty percent of the cargoes received by the United States).
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is to enroll these top businesses in the program.8 4 C-TPAT,
which is designed to aid the CSI, has more than 500 businesses
participating thus far. 85
2. Increasing Costs
Foreign ports forecast that participation in the CSI will be
very costly.8 6 In order to comply with the CSI requirements,
foreign ports must increase security and check containers more
carefully.8 7 Additionally, those ports that do not have radiation
technology to inspect containers will have to purchase and in-
stall it.88 Furthermore, because CSI requires that shipments
arrive at the port twenty-four hours prior to departure for the
United States, foreign port authorities foresee shortage of space
and slower processing.8 9 All of these factors will increase costs
for the foreign seaports. The ports, in turn, will pass these costs
on to consumers, who will pay more for consumer goods. 90
U.S. seaports must also spend additional funds to increase
security. 91 According to the U.S. Coast Guard, seaports will re-
quire roughly $1 billion in the first year to meet the necessary
security mandates, and $535 million per year thereafter. 92 Cur-
rently, federal funding is inadequate. Although the seaports re-
quested $750 million to finance security, equipment, and per-
sonnel costs, port security grants are $200 million, and only
$92.3 million has been disbursed thus far.93
84. Maritime Priorities Reordered, supra note 82 (noting that there are 1,000
businesses which account for sixty-one percent of the cargo received by the United
States).
85. Id.
86. See Wagner, supra note 79 (explaining that the Association for German
Seaports predicts increased port costs).
87. See id.
88. Ames, supra note 6 (noting that ports in less developed countries will face
enormous costs because they require scanners, radioactivity detectors, and other
high-tech equipment). But see Bonner's August Speech, supra note 14 (noting that
because the majority of the CSI partners already own sophisticated detection tech-
nology, CSI is not a "hugely expensive program").
89. See Wagner, supra note 79.
90. Lunan, supra note 33.
91. Port Authorities Criticize Lack of Funding for Crucial Security Measures,
LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Feb. 6, 2003, available at 2003 WL 3048766 [hereinafter Port
Authorities Criticize].
92. Gate Marshalling at Hanjin Container Terminal in Oakland, LLOYD'S LIST
INT'L, Apr. 29, 2003, available at 2003 WL 20187616 [hereinafter Gate Marshalling];
Maritime Priorities Reordered, supra note 82.
93. Gate Marshalling, supra note 92 (noting that according to some critics, al-
though the Bush administration has indicated maritime security is of crucial na-
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Furthermore, the 24-hour rule is a source of alarming con-
cern for exporters, importers, shippers, and their insurance pro-
viders. 94 This is because Customs can levy hefty monetary pen-
alties against "any party responsible" that does not comply
satisfactorily with the 24-hour manifest rule.95 Examples of
noncompliance include untimely filing of the manifest, inaccu-
rate manifests, and manifests lacking specific descriptions of
shipments.96 Also, vessels that fail to provide complete informa-
tion and passport numbers of all crew members can be detained
at the three-mile border off U.S. coasts. 97 As vessel owners sus-
pect that they will have to change procedures and acquire new
equipment to comply with the CSI, ship operators and their in-
surance companies predict that they will have higher costs.98
The 24-hour rule creates additional costs for businesses in
the form of losses as well. According to U.S. freight carriers and
manufacturers, the advance notification rule is likely to slow
down the movement of containerized shipping and disrupt sup-
tional interest, "the administration has repeatedly obstructed efforts to secure fed-
eral funding to even the most basic and critical of security enhancements, the con-
viction being that spending in this and other areas might jeopardise the greater pol-
icy goal of massive, enduring tax cuts"); Maritime Priorities Reordered, supra note
82; Port Authorities Criticize, supra note 91. Without adequate funding, many nec-
essary security procedures have been overlooked in the United States. Port Authori-
ties Criticize, supra note 91; Gate Marshalling, supra note 92. For example, to as-
sess risk and shortcomings properly, the top fifty-vie U.S. seaports require a
vulnerability assessment. Gate Marshalling, supra note 92. Thus far, two years
since the September i1th attacks, only five of these ports have gone through such
review. Id. However, it seems that Tom Ridge, Secretary of Homeland Security, is
trying to make the best of the situation. See id. He has stated that "[wie just have
to find a way to get it done with little or no money at all." Id.
94. See Operators Prepare for Rising Price of Fight Against Terrorism, LLOYD'S
LIST INT'L, Jan. 2, 2003, available at 2003 WL 3047365 [hereinafter Operators] (ex-
plaining that ship operators and insurers have liability concerns); Security-New US
Customs Regulations on Cargo Liability Give Cause for Concern, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L,
Dec. 18, 2002, available at 2002 WL 26532765 [hereinafter Cause for Concern] (not-
ing that the 24-hour rule gives rise to liability concerns).
95. Cause for Concern, supra note 94 (quoting document issued by Customs
that states, "[clustoms may initiate penalty actions against any party responsible for
providing the required information").
96. Id.
97. Operators, supra note 94 (noting that all crew members must obtain proper
documents, such as visas, at their own cost).
98. See id.; Toby Shelley, Squall Brewing Over the Costs of Tighter Maritime
Security, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2002, at 14, available at 2002 WL 103396576 (noting
that implementation of the CSI has been very difficult and quoting Chris Koch,
President of the World Shipping Council, as saying compliance with CSI has been
like "trying to drink out of a fire hose").
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ply chains of businesses. 99 Moreover, the International Agency
Association claims that the 24-hour rule will create congestion
and severe economic damage. 100 A report made by the Santiago
Chamber of Commerce of Chile illustrates the extent of the pos-
sible economic impact: between March and April of 2003, Chil-
ean exporters lost $3.75 million, which represents ten percent of
their exports to the United States. 10 1 The Chamber of Com-
merce stated that Customs' new regulations slowed the shipping
system and caused monetary losses.1 02 There is likely to be a
similar effect in the United States because U.S. industries rely
on a consistent stream of imports that are used almost immedi-
ately, within one or two days of arrival. 103 But the largest im-
pact will probably be felt by those businesses relying on last-
minute delivery of goods.10 4 These businesses already have in
place a "just-in-time system,"'105 where the inventory is strategi-
cally planned to time the arrival of each component as it is
needed.' 0 6 When goods do not arrive on time, the entire system
is thrown off schedule. Thus, when businesses fail to receive
necessary supplies due to delayed shipping, they will not oper-
ate efficiently and, as a result, suffer losses.
II. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP AND THEIR
COMMON POLICIES
Although the vast majority agrees that the CSI improves
security for the United States and global trade, the EU insists
that the United States should have struck a single multilateral
CSI agreement with the EU.107 Instead, the United States
99. Rick Brooks, Shippers Say New Border Rules Could Delay Just-in-Time
Cargo, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2003, at Al.
100. EU Members Go It Alone on 24-Hour Manifest Deals, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L,
Oct. 30, 2002, available at 2002 WL 26530671 (explaining that the 24-hour rule has
both support and opposition from the shipping industry).
101. Chile Claims New US Security Measures Hurt Chilean Exports, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Apr. 7, 2003, available at 2003 WL 2774009.
102. Id.
103. See H.D.S. Greenway, Coast Guard's New Challenge, BOSTON GLOBE, June
2, 2003, at A23.
104. See Brooks, supra note 99, at A10.
105. Id. (quoting Kevin Smith, director of trade compliance at General Motors
Corp., stating "the just-in-time system has been refined to the point where there is
no place to sit").
106. See Daniel Wren, Just-in-Time Inventory, KNOWLEDGE MGMT., Sept. 1999,
available at http://www.destinationkm.com/articles/ default.asp?ArticleID=165.
107. See, e.g., Security-Brussels Puts a Brake on US Drive for Ports, LLOYD'S
LIST INT'L, Sept. 12, 2002, available at 2002 WL 26528531; see also, US Security
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signed separate bilateral agreements with eight European na-
tions: the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, the United
Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and Sweden. 108
All eight nations are members of the EU. 109 The EU is a po-
litical union composed of fifteen nations that shares a set of uni-
form economic policies, laws, and rules. 110 Among the key insti-
tutions of the EU are the Council,111 the Commission,112 and the
Pact Talks Criticised, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Oct. 21, 2002, available at 2002 WL
26530269 (noting that some prominent members of the European shipping commu-
nity believe that "there should have been a global agreement in force between the
United States and the Europeans from the start" and "from a political standpoint
the Americans acted very badly. The United States should have started discussions
with the appropriate party in Europe, which was the Commission. It was a big mis-
take not to.").
108. See generally Containers-Spain Signs Up, supra note 8 (explaining that
after the Netherlands, France, Belgium and Germany joined, Italy and the United
Kingdom followed suit, and Spain joined last); see also Sweden Joins US Initiative
on Container Security, NORDIC Bus. REP., Feb. 4, 2003.
109. EUROPEAN COMM'N, THE INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION: WHO'S WHO IN THE EUROPEAN UNION? 8 (2001) (listing the members of the
EC).
110. See generally GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw (1992) [hereinafter BERMANN]. The history of the EU
dates to the European Economic Community (EEC), which was formed in 1957 when
six nations-France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands-
signed the Treaty of Rome. See generally EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 109; see
also H. Thomas Hefti, European Union Competition Law, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
613, 614 (1994). As the name suggests, the primary objective of the EEC was to es-
tablish an economic cooperation among the member nations. See generally
EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 109; see also Hefti, supra, at 614. In order to accom-
plish this goal, the signatory nations transferred several sovereign competences to
the EEC, including the power to oversee in the areas of customs, commercial policy
in dealing with third countries, transport, and competition. See generally EUROPEAN
COMM'N, supra note 109; see also Hefti, supra, at 614.
The EEC's successor, the EU, signed three additional treaties, the most re-
cent being the Treaty of Nice on December 11, 2000. EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note
109, at 3. The purpose of the Treaty of Nice was to implement changes that will
make the EU more effective. Id. at 1. Because thirteen additional nations are seek-
ing membership to the EU, increasing the effectiveness of the overall system was
important. Id. at 3. The thirteen nations are Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
and Turkey. Id. Ten of these nations are expected to join the EU by June 2004.
EUROPEAN COMM'N, Enlargement, available at http://europa.eu.intcomm
enlargement/enlargement.htm (noting that EU membership is contingent on the sat-
isfaction of economic and political requirements).
111. The Council represents the governments of the member states. EUROPEAN
COMM'N, supra note 109, at 9. Each member state has one representative at the
ministerial level in the Council. Id. The Council is the lead institution in the area
of common foreign and security policy. Id. All Council decisions are binding on the
member states. 2 DAMIAN CHALMERS & ERIKA SZYSZCZAK, EUROPEAN UNION LAW
151 (1998).
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Court of Justice. 113 These institutions implement and enforce
common policies in the areas of commerce, transport, and secu-
rity. 114 Common polices and other EU laws are binding on all
members of the Community. 115
The EU maintains that the Commission is the proper party
to enter into external agreements such as the CSI. 116 Further-
more, the Commission claims that the bilateral CSI agreements
are illegal under EU law because they are anti-competitive and
distort trade among EU ports.11 7 The Commission argues that
CSI ports will gain an unfair competitive advantage and export-
ers will divert shipments to CSI ports because CSI ports offer
faster clearance through Customs. 1 18 Consequently, the Com-
mission brought legal action against the eight EU members in
the Court of Justice. 119 If the Commission is successful in the
112. The European Commission is the body that proposes and implements com-
mon policies. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 109, at 13. The Commission de-
velops relations and negotiates with non-member countries. See K.P.E. LASOK & D.
LASOK, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 73 (Butterworths 7th ed.
2001); CHALMERS, supra note 111, at 153. Note that this institution has the power
to conduct external relations, which is the traditional "prerequisite for the estab-
lishment of a federal State." Id. at 156.
113. The Court of Justice enforces and interprets community law. EUROPEAN
COMM'N, supra note 109, at 15. Its jurisdiction extends to resolving disputes among
member states, the EU, and individuals. Id. However, the Court has an overload of
cases and, therefore, obtaining a judgment from the Court of Justice takes a very
long time. Id. When the EU membership grows to nearly 30 nations, this delay is
expected to worsen. Id.
114. Troy A. Eid, The European Union: A Brief Introduction, COLO. LAW., May
2002, at 11-12; EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, European Parliament Fact Sheets (Dec. 9,
2002), available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/factsheets/defaulten.htm.
115. See CHALMERS, supra note 111 (explaining that EU members must follow
the decisions made by the Council); see generally BERMANN, supra note 110.
116. Roger Hailey, US Security Laws Force a Rethink: America's Stringent New
Maritime Container Security Measures Will Provide Challenges for Suppliers,
LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Nov. 19, 2002, available at 2002 WL 26531538 (noting that the
EU opposes the American approach of conducting CSI agreements with individual
European member states); see also Containers-Spain Signs Up, supra note 8 (not-
ing that the EU has begun legal proceedings against the first four member states to
join CSI, and has made inquiries of the subsequent agreements).
117. Robin Pomeroy, U.S. Expands Port Anti-Terror Scheme, REUTERS ENG.
NEWS SERVICE, FEB. 12, 2003 (on file with author); EUIUnited States-Council
Grants Commission Negotiating Brief on Transport Security, EUROPEAN REPORT,
Mar. 22, 2003, available at 2003 WL 10439733.
118. See Brussels Calls for New Anti-Terrorism Rules for Ships, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, May 8, 2003, available at 2003 WL 2798027; EU Nations Give
Commission Mandate for Trans-Atlantic Talks on Port Security, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Mar. 18, 2003 (on file with author) (noting that the rate of clearance will undoubt-
edly vary from port to port).
119. Pomeroy, supra note 117.
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Court of Justice, the Court of Justice may rule the bilateral
agreements illegal and invalidate all eight CSI agreements. 120
A. COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY (CCP)121
Article 133 (ex art. 113) of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community (EC Treaty) expressly grants the EU
power to regulate policy concerning imports, exports, and com-
mercial agreements with non-member nations. 122 The aim of ar-
ticle 133 (ex art. 113) is to provide a commercial policy that is
"based on uniform principles."1 23  One important aim of this
principle is "the elimination of national disparities" that may af-
fect trade with non-member countries. 124 To best achieve this
goal, in Decision 69/494, the Council gave the EU the exclusive
power to carry out trade negotiations and agreements with non-
member countries. 125 The Court of Justice also supports this in-
terpretation of EU laws, as it held that "the Community enjoys
exclusive competence in the field of commercial policy." 26 Con-
120. Containers-Spain Signs Up, supra note 8 ("One official ... warned that
European courts could rule the bilateral agreements illegal under EU law.").
121. The CCP comprises Title IX (ex Title VII) of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. (C 325) 1 (2002) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
122. See P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1275 (Laurence W. Gormley ed., 3rd ed. 1998).
The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles,
particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff
and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of lib-
eralisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to
be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies.
EC TREATY art. 133 (ex art. 113). "The power granted by article 113 [133] is not lim-
ited to tariff and trade agreements but covers all aspects of the Community's com-
mon commercial policy, including export aids, credit, and finance, as well as the
matters normally forming part of multilateral commodity agreements." T.C.
HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 156 (4th ed. 1998).
123. EC TREATY art. 133 (ex art. 113).
124. KAPTEYN, supra note 122, at 127 (quoting Joined Cases 37 & 38/73, Sociaal
Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders v. NV Indiamex Ass'n de dait De Belder, 1973
E.C.R. 1609, 1623, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 222, 333 (1973)).
125. Council Decision 69/494, art. 5, 1969 O.J. SPEC. ED. 603, 604-04. The
member states were quite reluctant to lose their right to enact commercial policies
and carry out trade relationships. KAPETYN, supra note 1222, at 1324. In response,
the Council adopted Decision 69/494 after a long and laborious process. Id.
126. See LASOK, supra note 112, at 76; Case 22/70, Commission v. Council, 1971
E.C.R. 263, 269, [1971] C.M.L.R. 335, 354 (1971) (also known as ERTA); Opinion
1/75, Opinion of the Court Given Pursuant to Art. 228 of the EEC Treaty, 1975
E.C.R. 1355, 1364, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 85, 93 (1975). In Opinion 1/75, the Court of
Justice ruled that export credit agreements were closely related to trade, and thus
within the EEC Treaty and the jurisdiction of the EC. Opinion 1/75, 1975 E.C.R. at
1364, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. at 93.
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sequently, individual member states do not share concurrent
power in the area of commerce policy. Thus, individual states
are not allowed to conduct trade agreements with non-member
states in the absence of EU authorization. 127
On a theoretical level, "[t]he mere existence of EU compe-
tence in principle prohibits Member States from acting in these
areas." 128 Practically, unilateral action by member states is in-
compatible with the effective functioning of a single market. 129
As the Court of Justice explained:
the exercise of concurrent powers by the Member States and the
Community in [the area of common commercial policy] is impossible.
To accept that the contrary were true would amount to recognizing
that, in relations with third countries, Member States may adopt posi-
tions which differ from those which the Community intends to adopt,
and would thereby distort the institutional framework, call into ques-
tion the mutual trust within the Community and prevent the latter
from fulfilling its task in the defence of the common interest. 13 0
The remainder of article 133 (ex art. 113) spells out the pro-
cedures for carrying out trade agreements with non-member na-
tions.131 First, the Commission makes proposals to the Coun-
cil. 132 Second, the Council authorizes the Commission to open
negotiations. 133  Finally, the Commission and a Council-
appointed committee conduct negotiations. 134 Since the CSI is
an agreement concerning trade with a non-member state, the
clear implication is that the common commercial policy calls for
the Commission and the Council to carry out such agreements.
Furthermore, the CCP outlined in article 133 (ex art. 113) is
often regarded as "the external face" of the single or common
127. See KAPTEYN, supra note 122, at 1322-23. "The power granted by Article
113{133}... is exclusive: the Member States are precluded." HARTLEY, supra note
122, at 156.
128. CHALMERS, supra note 111, at 178.
129. See KAPTEYN, supra note 122, at 1323.
130. Opinion 1/75, 1975 E.C.R.1355, 1364, [1976] 1 CMLR at 93 (European
Court of Justice opinion on whether the EU has exclusive power to deal with non-
member states in reference to export credits).
131. LASOK, supra note 112, at 85.
132. EC TREATY art. 133(2) (ex art. 113(2)) ('The Commission shall submit pro-
posals to the Council for implementing the common commercial policy.").
133. Id. at art. 133(3) (ex art. 113(3)) ("Where agreements with one or more
States or international organisations need to be negotiated, the Commission shall
make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise the Commission to
open the necessary negotiations.").
134. Id. ('The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with
a special committee appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this task
and within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it.").
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market. 135 A fundamental aspect of the common market is that
it is strictly incompatible with anticompetitive behavior. 136 The
idea is that if the EU is to function as a single market, its mem-
bers should not implement policies that will disadvantage the
markets of other member states. Article 81 (ex art. 85) states
that such behaviors include actions that have the effect of dis-
torting competition, 137 controlling markets, 138 and giving a com-
petitive advantage to certain trading parties.1 39 Furthermore,
article 82 (ex art. 86) prohibits abuse of a dominant position
that may affect trade. 140 Thus, if the CSI produces any anti-
competitive behavior among the EU member states, or if the
states with larger or busier ports take advantage of their posi-
tion, the CSI is in violation of the EC Treaty.
135. See CHALMERS, supra note 111, at 168; U. Everling, The Law of the Exter-
nal Economic Relations of the European Community, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
AND THE GATT (M. Hilf, et al. eds., 2d ed. 1989). One commentator illustrated this
point by stating that if the single or "[common market] were a building, the CCP
would be its fagade." See CHALMERS, supra note 132, at 168 (quoting P. EECKHOUT,
THE EUROPEAN INTERNAL MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 344 (1994)).
136. "The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common mar-
ket: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings
and concerned practices which may affect trade between Member States and which
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the common market .... EC TREATY art. 81(1) (ex art. 85(1)). One com-
mentator notes that article 85 kicks in only when anticompetitive behavior affects
trade among member nations: "[I]f there is no such effect, EU law does not apply at
all." See Hefti, supra note 110, at 622.
137. EC TREATY art. 81(1) (ex art. 85(1)).
138. EC TREATY art. 81(1)(b) (ex art. 85(1)(b) (stating, 'limit or control produc-
tion, markets, technical development, or investment").
139. EC TREATY art. 81(1)(d) (ex 85(1)(d)) (stating, "apply dissimilar conditions
to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a
competitive disadvantage").
140. Article 82 (ex art. 86) states:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incom-
patible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between
Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other
unfair trading conditions...
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
EC TREATY art. 82 (ex art. 86).
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B. COMMON TRANSPORT POLICY AND THE RULINGS OF THE
COURT OF JUSTICE
Even in international trade matters where the CCP of the
EC Treaty is silent, the Community can derive implied powers
to act in those areas from other provisions of the EC Treaty. 4 1
Because one such area of silence concerns international trans-
port, 142 this further suggests that the CSI agreements conducted
by the individual member states are invalid. Although articles
70-80 (ex arts. 74-84) provide the general policies concerning
community transport, the articles do not contain express regula-
tions on international transport.143 Instead, article 71 indicates
that the original signatories of the European Economic Commu-
nity intentionally left the matter to the initiative of the Coun-
cil.144 Thus, the Council was to develop separate policies and
regulations concerning air and sea transport. 145 However, the
EU has been very slow in bringing this area of the law in line
with the rest of the modes of transport. 146
141. See Case 22/70, Commission v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263, 264, [1971] CMLR
335, 354 (1971).
142. G. Porter Elliott, Learning to Fly: The European Commission Enters Unfa-
miliar Skies in Review of the British Airways-American Airlines Alliance, 64 J. AIR
L. & COM. 157, 166 (1998).
143. See id.
144. See id.
[T]he Council shall, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in
Article 251 and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of the Regions, lay down: (a) common rules applicable to in-
ternational transport to or from the territory of a Member State or passing
across the territory of one or more Member States; (b) the conditions under
which non-resident carriers may operate transport services within a Mem-
ber State; (c) measures to improve transport safety; (d) any other appropri-
ate provisions.
EC TREATY art. 71 (ex art. 75).
145. See Elliott, supra note 142, at 166-67.
The Treaty expressly left the fate of air and sea transport to the initia-
tive of the Council of Ministers, leading most Member States to believe
that the Treaty provisions, including competition rules, would not cover air
[and sea] transport until the Council adopted provisions in this area ....
The Court of Justice of the European Communities held otherwise in
its 1986 Nouvelles Frontires judgment .... [T]he Court reasoned that the
exclusion of air and sea transport from the Title of the EC Treaty covering
transport does not exclude these sectors from the remaining general rules
of the Treaty.
Id. at 166-68.
146. See Rossina Petrova, Cabotage and the European Community Common
Maritime Policy: Moving Towards Free Provision of Services in Maritime Transport,
21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1019, 1057-58 (1998). Nevertheless, the European Court of
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As is apparent from the articles of transport policy, the EC
Treaty does not contain detailed provisions on the EU's foreign
affairs powers. 147 Therefore, the European Court of Justice
played a large role in outlining the EU's powers extending to ar-
eas dealing with non-member nations. 148 ERTA was the first
major case where the Court of Justice reviewed the EU's exter-
nal relations powers that dealt with matters of international
transport. 149 The Court noted that "[t]o determine in a particu-
lar case the Community's authority to enter into international
agreements, regard must be had to the whole scheme of the
Treaty no less than to its substantial provisions." 150 Further-
more, the Court emphasized that in the absence of an express
grant of power the EU's authority may arise from other provi-
sions of the EC Treaty. 151
Noting that the Treaty has provisions dealing with a simi-
lar internal transport policy,1 52 the Court pointed out that the
same provision also states "[t]he Community shall enter into
any negotiations with third countries which may prove neces-
sary for the purpose of implementing this regulation."1 53 The
Justice ruled on the matter of air transport on November 5, 2002. Case C-466/98,
Commission v. United Kingdom, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9427, 1 C.M.L.R. 6 at 178 (2003) (also
known as Re Open Skies Agreement). The Court held that individual member
states do not have jurisdiction to conduct bilateral agreements relating to air trans-
portation with the United States. Id. Rather, only the EU Commission has the
proper authority to carry out such negotiations with non-member states. Id.
147. See BERMANN, supra note 110, at 891.
148. See id. at 891-92.
149. See id. at 895. See also Commission v. Council, (ERTA), 1971 E.C.R. 263 at
264, 1971 C.M.L.R. 335. The issue in ERTA was whether the EU or the individual
member states was the proper party to negotiate the European Road Transport
Agreement (ERTA) with third countries. See BERMANN, supra note 1100, at 895.
150. Commission v. Council, (ERTA), 1971 E.C.R. 263 at 264, 1971 C.M.L.R. 335
at 354.
151. Id. In a later opinion, the Court of Justice emphasized this point again:
"authority to enter into international commitments may not only arise from an ex-
press attribution by the Treaty, but may also flow implicitly from its provisions."
Opinion 2/9 1, Opinion delivered pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 228
(1) of the EEC Treaty. Convention No 170 of the International Labour Organization
concerning safety in the use of chemicals at work, 1993 E.C.R. 1-1061, 3 C.M.L.R.
800 at 815 (1993); see LASOK, supra note 112, at 73.
152. Commission v. Council, (ERTA), 1971 E.C.R. 263 at 264, 1971 C.M.L.R. 335
at 335.
153. Commission v. Council, (ERTA), 1971 E.C.R. 263 at 264, 1971 C.M.L.R. 335
at 356. This concept came to be known as the ERTA doctrine:
[W]henever Community law has created for the institutions of the Commu-
nity powers within its internal system for the purpose of attaining a specific
objective, the Community has authority to enter into the international
commitments necessary for the attainment of that objective even in the ab-
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Court concluded that the ERTA negotiations fall under the ju-
risdiction of the EU.154 Lastly, the Court of Justice held that
this power is exclusive to the EU because a different conclusion
would violate the uniform principles. 155
C. COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
It has long been anticipated that the member states will
progressively cooperate in their political efforts and develop a
common defense policy. 156 All matters relating to the security of
the EU are embodied within the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) contained in the Treaty of European Union
(TEU).157 The TEU commands that the EU and its member
sence of an express provision in that connexion.
Opinion 1/76, Opinion of the Court of 26 April 1977. Opinion given pursuant to Arti-
cle 228 (1) of the EEC Treaty. 'Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up
fund for inland waterway vessels.', 1977 E.C.R. 741 at 755, 2 C.M.L.R. 279 at 295
(1977); see generally KAPTEYN, supra note 122, at 1256-58. In essence, the EU has
international powers that are necessary to carry out its internal commitments. See
id. at 1257-58.
154. "Since the subject-matter of the [ERTA] falls within the scope of Regulation
No. 543/69, the Community has been empowered to negotiate and conclude the
agreement in question." Commission v. Council, (ERTA), 1971 E.C.R. 263 at 264,
1971 C.M.L.R. 335 at 356.
155. 'These Community powers exclude the possibility of concurrent powers on
the part of Member States, since any steps taken outside the framework of the
Community institutions would be incompatible with the unity of the Common Mar-
ket and the uniform application of Community law." Id. The general rule on
whether the derived external power is exclusive will depend on whether the source
of the same power is exclusive. KAPTEYN, supra note 122, at 1259. "A derived ex-
ternal competence will have an exclusive character if competence has also been
ceded in the internal sphere." Id.
156. See BERMANN, supra note 110, at 924; see also CHALMERS, supra note 111,
at 198. The idea of a common defense policy has been on the table since before the
formation of the EEC. Id.
As far back as the early 1950s, attempts were made to promote European
integration in the fields of defence and foreign policy ... The Member States
agreed to regular consultations and exchanges of information in the hope
that this would lead to common positions and joint action in international
affairs.
HARTLEY, supra note 122, at 24.
157. See HARTLEY, supra note 122, at 25. Initially, member states coordinated
international efforts in a body known as the European Political Cooperation (EPC).
Id. at 24. Although the EPC and the EU functioned separately, the two came to-
gether when Title III of the Single European Act (SEA) recognized the EPC as an
institution of the EC. Id. Subsequently, Title V of the Treaty on European Union
(TEU) replaced Title III of the SEA. Id. at 25. When the Treaty of Amsterdam later
amended and restructured the TEU, the Common Foreign and Security Policy was
established (CFSP). Id. at 25-26. The source of the anticipation that the member
states will cooperate politically rests in the distinction between the SEA and the
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states implement a common foreign and security policy with the
following goals in mind: strengthen the security of the EU and
its member nations; strengthen international security; and
promote international cooperation.158
The TEU outlines two specific methods in which the EU
may attain these objectives. 159 One, member states inform and
consult each other on foreign and security matters of interest,
TEU. See BERMANN, supra note 110, at 924. The SEA states that the member na-
tions of the EU "shall endeavour jointly to formulate and implement a European for-
eign policy." SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT, June 29, 1987, O.J. (L 169) 13(1987) [hereinaf-
ter SEA]. They are also to "inform and consult each other on any foreign policy
matters of general interest." Id. art. 30(2)(a). Further, whenever a member nation
adopts an individual position, they are to "take full account of the positions" of other
members, and "ensure that common principles and objectives are gradually devel-
oped and defined." Id. art. 30(2)(c). On the other hand, the TEU states that "[t]he
Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy." Treaty on
European Union, art. 11(1) (ex art. J.1(1)), Dec. 24, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33 (2002)
[hereinafter TEU].
The Member States shall support the Union's external and security
policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.
•.. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the inter-
ests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in
international relations.
TEU art. 11(2) (ex art. J.1(4)).
158. See generally CHALMERS, supra note 111, at 201-04. TEU art. 11(1) (ex J.1)
states that the objectives of the common foreign and security policy are:
- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence
and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United
Nations Charter,
- to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways,
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance
with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles
of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including
those on external borders,
- to promote international cooperation,
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
TEU art. 11(1).
159. KAPTEYN, supra note 122, at 56. TEU art. 12 (ex art. J.1(3)) states:
The Union shall pursue the objectives set out in Article 11 by:
defining the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign
and security policy,
deciding on common strategies,
adopting joint actions,
adopting common positions,
strengthening systematic cooperation between Member states in the con-
duct of policy.
TEU art. 12.
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and develop a systematic coordination of policy; 160 or two, mem-
ber states take joint action on an issue of common interest
through a gradual implementation process. 161 The EU "pursues
the CFSP by various means: defining the principles and general
guidelines on which it is to be based; deciding on common
strategies; adopting joint actions; adopting common positions;
and strengthening co-operation between the Member States."1 62
However, when trade safety issues arise, Reg. 2315/96163
provides that member states may provide information and re-
quest that the EU implement measures to survey and safeguard
trade. 164 The member states begin this procedure first by mak-
ing the request to the Commission. 165 Next, an Advisory Com-
mittee composed of member state representatives discusses the
matter.166 If the Commission finds that sufficient evidence sup-
ports it, the Community begins an investigation process. 167
Within nine months of the investigation, the Commission de-
160. See id. art. 16; see generally KAPTEYN, supra note 122, at 55-62. There is no
specific definition or criteria for what constitutes "of general interest." Id. at 56.
The Council Ministers have the power to decide that the matter is of general interest
and that it is indeed necessary. Id. at 55 (citing TEU art. J.2(2) 1 (now art. 15)
("Whenever it deems it necessary, the Council shall define a common position.")).
Then, upon a unanimous agreement by the Council, the policy will become a com-
mon position. See id. (citing TEU art. J.8(2) 2 (now art. 23) ('The Council shall act
unanimously, except for procedural questions and in the case referred to in Article
J.3(2).")). Such a policy will be binding on all member states. Id. (citing TEU art.
J.2(2) 2) (now art. 15) ("Member States shall ensure that their national policies con-
form on the common positions.").
161. See supra note 159. See generally, KAPTEYN, supra note 1.22, at 55-62.
TEU art. 14 (ex art. J.3) prescribes that the Council must unanimously agree that a
particular issue will be subject to joint action. See id. at 56 (citing TEU art. J.3(1)
1 (now art. 14(1)). The Council can agree by a unanimous vote that certain issues
will only be subject to a qualified majority vote. See id. (citing TEU Art. J.3(2) 1
(now art. 23(2)). 'The unanimity rule does not apply in all cases: the Council acts by
a qualified majority when adopting joint actions, common positions or other deci-
sions on the basis of common strategy, or when adopting a decision implementing a
joint action or common position." HARTLEY, supra note 122, at 25.
162. HARTLEY, supra note 122, at 25 (citing TEU art. 12).
163. Regulation 2315/96, Council Regulation (EC) No 2315/96 of 25 November
1996 Establishing, Pursuant to Article 1 (7) of Regulation (EEC) 3030/93, the List of
Textiles and Clothing Products to Be Integrated into GATT 1994 on 1 January 1998
and Amending Annex X to Regulation (EEC) No 3030/93 and Annex II to Regulation
(EC) No 3285/94, 1996 O.J. (L 314) 1.
164. See KAPTEYN, supra note 122, at 1300. Reg. 2315/96 is the amended Regu-
lation 3285/94, Council Regulation (EC) No 3285/94 of 22 December 1994 on the




167. Id. at 1300-01.
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cides whether the EU will adopt surveillance and safeguard
measures.
168
D. POWERS UNCLAIMED BY THE EU
Finally, in matters where the EU has powers, but it has not
yet exercised its competency, member states have the authority
to act upon it.169 In Kramer, the Court of Justice held that such
power is only transitional in nature, and thus, it will terminate
when the EU comes to a resolution on the matter. 170 Further,
the Court added that while the member state is exercising this
authority, all other community laws and duties bind the state. 17 1
Therefore, the member nation may not enter into agreements
that potentially conflict with other EU laws. 172
III. THE CSI AND THE EU
If the CSI falls under any section of the TEU, the laws of
the EU bind the CSI.173 If the applicable EU law deems the
matter to be of common interest, the Community itself has the
authority to handle the CSI.174 In this case, the EU has exclu-
sive power.1 75 The key to solving this problem is to pinpoint the
exact provision of the TEU that would govern the CSI. But be-
cause the CSI incorporates components of commerce, transport,
and security, several sections of the TEU are pertinent.
Although several articles of the TEU are applicable to the
CSI, the EU has a strong case under the CCP of the EC Treaty
because the CSI distorts uniformity among the EU member
states.1 76 The EU's position is further strengthened by the re-
cent Court of Justice decision in Open Skies, which invalidated
168. Id. at 1301.
169. See BERMANN, supra note 110, at 905-07. "[The Community not yet having
fully exercised its functions in the matter, ... the Member States had the power to
assume commitments, within the framework." Cases 3/76, 4/76, and 6/76, Cornelias
Kramer and Others (In re Kramer), 1976 E.C.R. 1279, 2 C.M.L.R. 470 (1976).
170. Cases 3/76, 4/76, and 6/76, Cornelias Kramer and Others (In re Kramer),
1976 E.C.R. 1279, 2 C.M.L.R. 470 (1976).
171. Id. ("Member states concerned are now bound by Community obligations in
their negotiations within the framework of the Convention and of other comparable
agreements.").
172. Member nations are "under a duty not to enter into any commitment within
the framework of those conventions which could hinder the Community." Id. at 471.
173. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 125-26, 155 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
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bilateral open skies agreements that had the effect of distorting
competition.177 Furthermore, the EU derives implied powers
from the express provisions of the TEU.178 Thus, because the
EU has both express and implied authority to govern the CSI,
the Commission is the proper party to negotiate the CSI with
Customs. Therefore, if the EU maintains its legal action, the
Court is most likely to declare the eight CSI agreements ille-
gal. 179
A. THE CSI IS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE EU
1. CCP
The EU can exert its authority over the CSI with its CCP18o
powers under the EC Treaty because the CSI concerns trade
with a non-member state.181 First, the CSI is an agreement con-
cerning trade. 8 2 By signing the CSI, the United States and its
trade partner agree that Customs agents will be stationed in the
partner's seaport and work alongside the partner's team to im-
prove export procedures.18 3  Furthermore, the focus of the
agreement is trade protection. 184 The export products will be
subject to further scrutiny,18 5 and both parties will work to-
wards developing an efficient and safe trade mechanism.18 6
Second, the CSI is an agreement with a non-member state.18 7
Only the EU enjoys the power to carry out negotiations with
non-EU member nations.188 Furthermore, since the objective of
article 133 (ex art. 113) is to establish "uniform principles"'189
and to eliminate "national disparities,"'190 it is most effective and
desirable for the EU alone to negotiate with the United States.
177. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 151, 153 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (noting that the CCP concerns
power to regulate imports and exports with non-member states).
182. See supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text. See also EC TREATY art. 133
(ex 113) ("trade agreements").
183. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
184. See EC TREATY art. 133 (ex 113) ("measures to protect trade").
185. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
187. See EC TREATY art. 133 (ex 113) and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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Only the uniform application of a single U.S.-EU CSI policy is
compatible with the CCP of the EC Treaty.
Furthermore, only a single U.S.-EU CSI agreement can pro-
tect the EU's common market status. 191 Currently, the eight
CSI agreements impair the EU's ability to function effectively as
a single market. 192 In a unified market, all seaports should be
regulated under the same rules and procedures. 193 When manu-
facturers choose a seaport from which to ship their products
abroad, they should expect the same procedures from each of the
available seaports. Therefore, only market and economic factors
influence their decision. These factors include the distance be-
tween their plant or warehouse and the port, the cost and the
ease of transport between the two locations, and any major dif-
ferences in the cost of shipping that the ports may assess.
Since the introduction of the CSI into select countries in
Europe, the exporter has two choices: (1) ship under the tradi-
tional procedures, or (2) ship under the CSI procedures. 194 The
container cargoes shipping from CSI ports are subject to more
scrutiny, so there may be additional delays at the CSI port. 95
However, upon arriving at the U.S. seaport, the container will
pass more expediently through Customs. 196 It is predicted that
exporters who ship from CSI ports will enjoy faster shipping to
the United States. 97 This incentive is not market-driven.
In that case, normal market forces do not determine the
manufacturer's choice. The exporter will weigh the costs and
benefits of shipping from a non-CSI and a CSI seaport, and
make the decision accordingly. A CSI seaport will replace ports
that were previously the best economical choice if the manufac-
turer wishes to benefit from expedited export to the United
191. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
193. See Taxation and Customs Union: The Customs Policy of the European Un-
ion, at http://europa.eu.int/commltaxationcustoms/publications/customs/customs-
brochure.html (stating that the "single market can only function properly where
there are common rules applied in a common way at its external borders") (last vis-
ited Sept. 12, 2003).
194. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 68.
197. EU Will Not Tolerate Bilateral Agreements on Maritime Security, FEPORT
NEWSFLASH, July 19, 2002, 2 (stating that CSI ports offer advanced Customs inspec-
tions, reduced inspections in the United States, and an advantage over other EU
ports); Prevention, supra note 42 (noting that shipments will clear through Customs
rapidly through CSI ports).
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States. But many manufacturers who choose to ship from a CSI
seaport will be those who can afford to reroute their products.
There may be exporters who do not benefit from this option due
to high rerouting costs. In this case, a non-market driven factor
distorts the manufacturer's business practice, the manufac-
turer's choice of seaport, and the transport system within the
EU. Thus, the current state of CSI also distorts the market, in
derogation of the principles of article 133 (ex art. 113).198
Additionally, competition among the seaports may be dis-
torted.199 Article 81 (ex art. 85) prohibits distortion of competi-
tion.200 Seaports receive much of their financing through fees
paid by exporters for use of their facilities. Since it is expected
that more manufacturers will prefer to ship from CSI seaports,
those seaports will see increased gains. Consequently, non-CSI
seaports will be at a significant competitive disadvantage.
Although Customs denies that the CSI has distorted compe-
tition within the EU,2° 1 actual distortion is not the only stan-
dard for violating the CCP of the EC Treaty.20 2 The CSI violates
the CCP of the EC Treaty if the agreement "may affect trade"
and its "object or effect" is the "prevention, restriction or distor-
tion of competition."20 3 On one hand, it is undisputed that CSI
''may affect trade." Customs does not challenge this possibility.
On the other hand, because CSI is thus far "only a program on
paper"20 4 that has yet to go into effect, reliable data on its actual
influence on the market will not be available for some time.
Therefore, one cannot prove the "effect" of distortion as of yet.
However, the EU has a good argument that the eight mem-
ber states signed the CSI with the "object" of preventing, re-
stricting, or distorting competition. 20 5 All member states under-
stand the competitive advantage of signing the CSI. The
addition of Marseilles as a CSI seaport illustrates this point:
Customs did not include Marseilles in the initial list of target
mega ports because Marseilles is not a top twenty seaport. 206
198. See supra note 122.
199. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
204. R. G. Edmonson, Left Out. European Union Officials Would Like All Inter-
national Agreements Affecting EU, TRAFFIC WORLD, Feb. 3, 2003, available at 2003
WL 10213152.
205. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
206. Marseilles Joins US Box Security Ports, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Apr. 16, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 3051873.
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But since the publication of the initial list in 2002, Marseilles
campaigned to be added, and Customs approved it as a CSI sea-
port in March of 2003.207 The CSI status gives the Marseilles
seaport a competitive advantage because exporters will experi-
ence fewer delays in shipping products to the United States. 208
The advantage was so clear that the signatory nations went
against the mandates of the EU Commission. For example,
Sweden does not have a top-twenty mega port, and received its
invitation to sign the CSI much later than the seven other EU
signatories. 209 By the time it received its invitation, the Com-
mission had already begun legal proceedings against the first
group of signatories.210 Though fully aware that upon signing
the CSI the EU Commission would begin legal actions against
it, Sweden signed the CSI.211 The eight member states signed
the CSI to gain a competitive advantage over the other EU sea-
ports.
A further issue of competition is that the CSI seaports may
have taken advantage of a dominant position. 212 Since the
United States initially only approached the top-twenty mega
ports, it is fair to state that mega port status gave the CSI sea-
ports a dominant position. Taking advantage of a dominant po-
sition is anticompetitive behavior that is prohibited by article 82
(ex art. 86).213
Therefore, the eight CSI agreements that are currently in
effect conflict with articles 133 (ex art. 113), 81 (ex art. 85), and
82 (ex art. 86).214 On the other hand, a single multilateral CSI
negotiated between the EU and the United States that is uni-
formly applied to the Community would conform to each of the
three aforementioned provisions.
2. Transport Policy
Because the CSI affects maritime transport, it falls within
the regulations of maritime transport. Although the EU has au-
thority from the Common Transport Policy (CTP) to regulate in-
ternal maritime transport, the same is not true for external
207. Id.
208. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 8.
210. See supra note 8.
211. See supra note 8.
212. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 122-40 and accompanying text.
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transport. 215 Although the signatories of the EEC did not grant
such express powers to the EU,2 16 the Court of Justice stated
that the EU might exercise implied external powers when such
is necessary to carry out its express duties. 217 Thus, if external
maritime transport will have an effect on the EU's internal
maritime transport, the EU has proper jurisdiction to oversee
the former. 218
More specifically, if the eight separate CSI agreements are
likely to have an effect on transport within the EU, the EU can
exercise its implied power to regulate external maritime trans-
port. 219 It is certainly foreseeable that the manufacturers' re-
routing of their export products to CSI seaports will affect in-
ternal transport. Private transportation service providers such
as trucking companies may create additional routes to the CSI
seaports. Also, public transportation services, such as trains,
may do the same. Therefore, the EU has proper authority to
oversee the CSI due to the CSI's effects on internal transport.
Additionally, the Open Skies decision of November 5, 2002
will certainly have a significant impact on the outcome of the
CSI litigation.220 This is because both Open Skies and the CSI
concern bilateral agreements between the United States and in-
dividual member states of the EU.221 More importantly, air
transport and sea transport, which the Open Skies and the CSI
deal with respectively, were specifically left to the initiative of
the Council.222 The original members of the EEC viewed air and
sea transport to be substantially related as to include them in
the same mandate. 223 Thus, the Court of Justice will probably
apply the Open Skies decision 224 to the CSI, and most likely rule
in favor of the EU. Therefore, transport policy is an additional
source from which the EU can derive its exclusive authority to
deal with the CSI. 225
215. See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 153, 155 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 153, 155 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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3. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
Because one could consider the CSI a defense policy aimed
at protecting the EU member states, the EU might also argue
that the eight signatories violated the CFSP of the TEU.226
Such a violation exists on two levels. First, they failed to take
joint action on an issue of common interest.227 Joint action in
international affairs is an ideal that the original members of the
EEC envisioned. 228 This is true especially in agreements such
as the CSI, where it affects other member states' trade inter-
ests. 229 Second, the eight states seem to have failed to consider
the interests of the other states,230 an omission at odds with the
CFSP of the TEU.231 The eight CSI signatories will have diffi-
culty claiming that they considered the interests of other states
since the CSI agreements have the potential to cause significant
competition distortions.232 Thus, the EU can effectively argue
that the eight signatories violated the CFSP of the TEU.
The member states may claim that pursuit of CFSP goals 233
was not possible due to the urgency of trade protection on one
hand, and the lengthy CFSP compliance procedure on the
other.234 However, this argument is likely to fail because none
of the signatories attempted to take any of the steps prescribed
by the TEU235 or Reg. 2315/96,236 which outline the procedure
for dealing with trade safety issues.
4. Powers Unclaimed by the EU
Since the CSI is such a novel program, the EU may have
the authority to act upon it even though it has yet to exercise its
powers. 23 7 In that case, the eight member states that negotiated
the CSI with the United States will claim to have exercised
226. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
227. See SEA arts. 30(1), 30(2)(a), 30(2)(c).
228. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text. Rather than developing
individual foreign policies, the member states should first seek to implement com-
mon policies. See SEA art. 30(1).
229. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
230. See SEA art. 30(2)(c).
231. See id.
232. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 157.
234. See supra notes 159-68 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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their transitional powers to act in the absence of collective EU
action.238 The fact that Germany's CSI contains a clause ex-
pressing its willingness to defer to an U.S.-EU CSI shows that
some member states realize and acknowledge that their author-
ity to conduct the CSI may be transitional. 239 If the EU enters
into a CSI agreement with the United States, the eight CSI
agreements will become null. 240
At the same time, in exercising an unclaimed power, the
member states must comply with all other community laws. 2
41
The CSI signatory states violated the CCP of the EC Treaty by
disrupting uniformity and competition laws.242 Thus, the states
failed to make proper use of the EU's unclaimed power.243 As a
result, the Court of Justice may rule that the signatory states
did not have authority to use the unclaimed power in the first
instance, and may declare the eight CSI agreements invalid.244
The EU's strongest argument is under the CCP of the EC
Treaty. The second best argument is under the CTP, and fi-
nally, the CFSP of the TEU Treaty is the weakest of the three.
Although the signatory states may argue that they acted under
the EU's unclaimed powers, the Court of Justice is not likely to
agree because the states violated EU laws in the process.
IV. BALANCING THE POSITIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EU
In order to develop the best possible solution for the United
States and the EU, first it is necessary to analyze the positions
of each. On the one hand, the United States implemented the
CSI in an effort to protect itself and the world trading system
from the threat of terrorist attacks.245  The United States
reached agreements with the eight EU member nations because
the ports providing the largest amount of containers to the
United States are positioned in those countries. 246 On the other
hand, the EU has legitimate legal and economic concerns. 247
238. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 86-244 and accompanying text.
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The bilateral agreements violate EU laws.248 Additionally, the
CSI and the two subsequent programs implemented to give ef-
fect to CSI-the 24-hour rule and C-TPAT-are expected to re-
sult in increased costs for the trading community, as well as for
consumers.
249
Both the United States and the EU agree that trade safety
is necessary. The EU does not dispute the importance of the
CSI.250 However, the parties conflict over the procedures neces-
sary to execute the CSI in the EU.251 Therefore, the solution lies
in finding a procedural ground that is mutually acceptable to
both parties.
A. UNITED STATES: THE IMPORTANCE OF INCREASING SEAPORT
SAFETY
Despite the controversy surrounding the Open Skies agree-
ments,252 the United States pursued bilateral agreements with
individual member states of the EU.253 Although this seems
rather puzzling from a legal perspective, it was certainly a stra-
tegic move. The United States had to balance two competing in-
terests: showing respect for EU sovereignty and its laws by fol-
lowing proper procedures in negotiating agreements with EU
member states, 254 and the urgent need for implementing and in-
creasing costly safety measures. 255 Given the disastrous effects
of September 11th, the United States chose the latter.
The United States immediately needed to increase safety
standards.256 If terrorists were capable of penetrating airports
with heightened security, other terrorists would have very few
problems penetrating U.S. seaports to facilitate another terror-
ist strike. 257 Unlike airports, seaports have minimal security in
248. See supra notes 107-244 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 94-106 and accompanying text.
250. US Container Security Initiative (CSI)--Meeting of Commission and US
Customs Officials, Oct. 22, 2002, available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/
guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt=gt&doc=MEMO/02/2201 01 RAPID&lg'EN ("The Euro-
pean Community shares the objective of improving maritime transport security and
protecting trade against any threat of terrorist attack.").
251. See supra notes 107-08, 116 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 146.
253. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
254. See generally supra notes 108-72 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 13-57 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 13-57 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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the absence of federal regulation.258 Although the United States
felt an urgent need to heighten its seaports' safety standards,
establishing a new federal agency to oversee seaport security
was not a viable solution due to time constraints.
Rather than creating a new agency, the United States fo-
cused on measures that would most effectively and immediately
improve seaport safety. First, seaports were in need of adequate
physical barriers to filter out terrorism. 259 It was imperative to
prevent terrorists already present in the United States from
gaining access to the seaports. 260 As many seaports did not con-
trol access or even have adequate fences and gates, this was a
crucial step. 261 Second, it was important to inspect more thor-
oughly the cargoes entering the seaports. 262 Given that ninety-
eight percent of the cargoes were not screened or checked, this
provided room for many potential dangers. 263 Although this
problem could be fixed by checking every container, such a prac-
tice is not viable from a commercial standpoint. 264 Trade would
be a slower process, 265 and industries that depend on it would
have to rearrange their practices to accommodate for the wait
time. Businesses would be short on supplies and inventories for
prolonged periods of time, and many would suffer losses or go
out of business. Additionally, costs of consumer goods would
undoubtedly skyrocket because the demand would be much
higher than the supply. Therefore, the United States sought an
efficient solution that would strike a balance between commerce
and security.
Customs suggested an innovative plan that would achieve
such a goal: the CSI, which would improve Customs' traditional
practice of identifying high-risk cargoes. 266 As the success of
Customs' risk assessment procedure depended on multiple fac-
tors, including accurate information on shipments, 267 timely re-
ceipt of information, 268 and ability to detect risk early,269 the
258. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. But cf. supra notes 43-51
and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 53-54, 56 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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CSI would focus on improving the effectiveness and the coordi-
nation of these factors.
The 24-hour rule and the C-TPAT would further promote
the goals of the CSI. The 24-hour rule, which was implemented
to aid the first element of the CSI program,270 requires all ex-
porters to provide detailed descriptions of the shipments twenty-
four hours before they are loaded on the vessel headed for the
United States.271  Thus, the manifest rule allows Customs
agents in foreign ports twenty-four hours to analyze data and
assess risk.2 7 2 The third factor, the ability to detect risk early, is
addressed by C-TPAT and the CSI.273 Customs implemented C-
TPAT to give effect to the first element of the CSI, and the busi-
nesses and industries participating in this program heightened
their own security. 274 Therefore, Customs can be assured that
from the time the shipments' products were manufactured and
assembled to the time the products reach the seaports, terrorists
have not tampered with them. 275 C-TPAT serves to filter out a
large percentage of safe cargoes from those that must go
through the risk assessment procedure. 276 Thus, C-TPAT pro-
motes a more accurate and efficient early detection system. 277
Furthermore, the CSI agents in the foreign ports analyze data
and scrutinize the cargoes that pose the greatest threat.278
The United States approached the EU member states indi-
vidually with its CSI proposal, along with the 24-hour rule, for
economic reasons. Since the United States received the majority
of its cargoes from mega ports, 279 it was most efficient for the
United States to negotiate only with those countries that had a
mega port within its borders. Negotiations with countries lack-
ing a mega port would not be cost-effective because the time and
effort required to implement the additional CSI agreements
would take away significantly from U.S. safety interests. Thus,
the United States did not negotiate directly with the EU.28 0 Be-
cause the EU aims to establish a single market, 28' the EU would
270. See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 76.
272. See supra notes 65-66, 75 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 58-85 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 79-84.
275. See supra notes 79-84.
276. See supra notes 79-84.
277. See supra notes 79-84.
278. See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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have wished to apply uniformly CSI regulations on all of its sea-
ports. However, bringing every seaport of every EU nation up to
CSI standards was much more than the United States was will-
ing and able to do. Given the lack of funds available for U.S.
seaports, it is unlikely that Customs had the necessary staff or
resources to implement such an extensive program so quickly
after September llth.282 With limited funds available, Customs
would have had difficulty stationing agents in every EU seaport.
Additionally, conducting negotiations with the EU is often a
lengthy procedure that involves approval by the members of the
Commission and the Counsel. 283 Because seaports in the United
States process 200,000 ships and almost 6 million cargoes a
year,28 4 cargo safety is vital to ensuring national security. Con-
sequently, protecting national security was necessarily more
important for the United States than complying with the EU's
formal procedures. Given the poor condition of U.S. seaport se-
curity, the need for improvements was urgent.28 5 Furthermore,
seaport safety is important for the world economy because sea-
ports serve as convergence points and link the world's largest
trading system.28 6 The cost of disrupting this system could be
$58 billion in the United States alone. 28 7 Many other nations
throughout the world would suffer similar losses. Considering
that the measurable economic effects of September 11th lasted
over a year, the effects of a crippled ship container system would
most certainly last much longer than a year.28 8 Thus, given the
urgency to implement safety measures, the United States was
not in a position to go through the formalities of EU procedures.
B. EU: ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
On the other hand, the EU has legitimate reasons for want-
ing to negotiate a single U.S.-EU CSI that would apply uni-
formly to all of its members. 28 9 First, the primary purpose of es-
tablishing the EU was to promote economic cooperation among
282. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also notes 28-30 and accom-
panying text.
288. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 86-90, 94-106, 116-18 and accompanying text.
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its members. 290 Therefore, the single market directive goes to
the heart of the EU, and thus it is most important to implement
common economic policies. 29 1 The EU correctly asserts that only
a single CSI agreement can accomplish the goal of the single
market. 292 Any other policy would leave room for variations
among the member states, which would be incompatible with
the notion of a single market.293 When eight out of fifteen mem-
ber states adopt the CSI approach, there is no single market
functioning as one.
Most crucial to the single market concept is the distortion of
competition.294 Although competition is natural and healthy for
a prosperous economy, creating competition by introducing arti-
ficial components to the market may lead to unforeseen eco-
nomic consequences. Even in the absence of disfavored conse-
quences, however, EU principles do not permit distortion of
competition by unnatural and non-market driven factors such as
the CSI.295 This is because distortion of competition is in dero-
gation of the aims of the single market-the single market
should function uniformly as one without allowing one to gain
unfair advantages over the other.296 Yet, individual CSI agree-
ments may have given the eight participating states just such
an advantage. After September 11th, the mega ports unexpect-
edly gained an upper hand over the other EU seaports. With
CSI status, the mega ports offer a speedier transport to the
United States. 29 7
In addition to these theoretical concerns, the EU has more
imminent practical concerns that it must address. The trading
community has voiced concern over the expected costliness of
implementing the CSI and its related initiatives, especially the
24-hour rule. 298 The 24-hour rule will affect foreign ports, ex-
porters, businesses, importers, and consumers.299 First, sea-
ports will have to make room for shipments stationed while
Customs agents make inspections. 300 Because this will slow the
290. See supra note 110.
291. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 86-90, 94-106 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 86-90, 94-106 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 62-71.
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overall procedure, seaports will have to expend increased proc-
essing costs to maintain the flow of trade.30 1 Second, exporters
or shipment handlers will have to make certain that their ship-
ments are ready and complete twenty-four hours prior to depar-
ture.302 Thus, exporters whose practice was to drop off ship-
ments a few hours before the departure time will have to change
their normal business procedures. 303 Third, businesses may face
higher costs because exporters will not be able to add new ship-
ments to their cargoes after the twenty-four hour deadline. 30 4
This will result in a more regimented export business that is
unable to accommodate last-minute business needs. 30 5 Also,
businesses will have to rearrange manufacturing and processing
procedures to meet the shipment handlers' deadlines. 30 6 Fourth,
importers will have to pay higher prices to ship their goods.
Lastly, all of the above costs will funnel down to consumers. 3° 7
Another concern for the EU is that there can be additional
costs if parties involved in the trading business fail to comply
with the 24-hour rule.3 08  Customs can levy hefty penalties-
from monetary fees to shipment detainment. 30 9 Also, failure to
comply with the 24-hour rule could lead to unexpected results.
For example, an exporter whose shipment is detained would not
be able to provide his goods to an importer. If the importer ob-
tains the goods from another source, the exporter may have lost
a customer.
C-TPAT creates additional security costs for the businesses
and the industries. 310 Those who participate in the program will
have to implement new procedures and/or purchase additional
safety or monitoring equipment. 311  Many businesses have
joined C-TPAT because Customs promises to give them faster
clearance through security.3 12  Businesses understand that
faster procedures can save costs. However, it might be that,
rather than a faster process, the only benefit businesses will re-
ceive is a lesser delay than others in passing through Customs.
301. See supra notes 62-71.
302. See supra notes 76-77.
303. See supra notes 76-77.
304. See supra notes 76-77.
305. See supra note 70.
306. See supra note 70.
307. See supra notes 88-89.
308. See supra notes 94-99.
309. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 80-85.
311. See supra notes 80-85.
312. See supra notes 80-85.
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But the most costly policy for the seaports has proven to be
the third element of the CSI, which requires that the seaports
use radiation technology to screen cargoes. 3 13 Because many
foreign seaports did not use such devices prior to the CSI agree-
ments, the seaports expended large amounts of money to pur-
chase such technology. 314 Also, the CSI requirement that the
foreign seaports use heightened scrutiny results in higher costs
for the seaports. 315
Thus, contrary to the Customs Commissioner's statement,
CSI is proving to be very costly for those parties directly in-
volved in trade. 316 These include the manufacturers and other
businesses, exporters, importers, and the seaports. 317  Ulti-
mately, all costs are shifted to the consumers because prices will
increase. 318 Lastly, economists project that the economy will
suffer as a consequence of the security measures because busi-
nesses will face higher costs of operation.3 19 Given the economic
effects of the CSI, the EU has a legitimate interest in negotiat-
ing the CSI because one of the aims of the EU is to protect the
single market economy.
C. SOLUTION
1. Obstacles to a Solution
Although both the United States and the EU have legiti-
mate concerns and interests over the implementation of the CSI,
their interests are not aligned. Their interests are different in
three respects. First, the United States requires an immediate
solution, whereas the EU is in no such hurry for a trade protec-
tion program. 320 After the September 11th attacks, the United
States needed to increase security without delay because its sea-
313. See supra note 70.
314. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
315. See supra note 91-93 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 86-106 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 94-106 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
319. See supra note 94-106 and accompanying text. This is certainly not the
case for the security market. For example, manufacturers of radiation devices and
other security machinery, as well as software companies that produce security-
related programs and other CSI compliance programs, such as 'Manifest 24," will
not suffer as a consequence. See Manifest 24, supra note 76.
320. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
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seaports were at risk of being targeted by terrorists.321 On the
other hand, the EU is not in a similar situation, and does not
share the same feeling of immediacy to increase security. Con-
sequently, the United States rushed to address the situation,
whereas the EU had more time to plan the details of a trade
protection program. Second, whereas the United States prefers
to negotiate with select member states, the EU favors an agree-
ment applicable to all member states.322 The most efficient
route for the United States was negotiating with the mega
ports.323 But a single, multilateral CSI is best suited for the EU
because the EU seeks to maintain uniformity among its member
nations.324 Third, although the United States would prefer to
let the eight bilateral agreements stand, the EU is adamant
about annulling them.325 Since the United States already suc-
ceeded in attaining its goal by signing up the major seaports of
the EU,326 it has little or no additional incentives to alter the
agreements. The bilateral CSI programs are under way, and
modifying them would only result in more costs for the United
States. Further, Customs would probably prefer to utilize the
available resources to enforce existing programs at the mega
ports, rather than spending its funds to initiate new programs
at smaller EU seaports. However, the EU has much to gain by
invalidating the bilateral agreements because such action would
eliminate threats of trade distortion and anti-competitiveness
among member states. 327  Additionally, with the bilateral
agreements invalidated, the EU would have more leverage in
negotiating a single CSI with the United States. Thus, the gap
between the interests of the United States and the EU is exten-
sive, and aligning these interests will prove to be a challenging
task.
Furthermore, U.S. and EU cooperation may be more diffi-
cult because both parties have taken steps that have aroused
negative sentiments toward each other. The United States in-
troduced the CSI,328 the 24-hour rule, 329 and the C-TPAT, 3 30 all
321. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
323. See generally supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 60-62, 108 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 58-75 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
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of which have generated significant costs for the trade commu-
nity in the EU. 331 Although the United States had legitimate
reasons for instituting these programs, the current state of
these programs gives rise to some questions.Y3 2 First, did the
United States sufficiently analyze the feasibility of implement-
ing these programs before negotiating CSI agreements? Fur-
thermore, businesses in the EU are expecting much difficulty
meeting the required costs. 333 This poses a second question: did
the United States sufficiently analyze the costs of implementa-
tion? And the fact that even the U.S. seaports-which the pro-
grams are intended to protect-are significantly short on
funds 334 raises a third question: did Customs perform with due
diligence and plan adequately? It is possible that Customs may
have performed insufficient due diligence in the rush to develop
fast solutions on safety.335 However, it is equally possible that
Customs may have performed all the necessary analysis and in-
vestigations, but ultimately determined that the benefits of the
bilateral CSI agreements outweighed the side effects. It is also
possible that the negative effects of the CSI may be temporary
and short lived, and that the CSI may be beneficial for global
trade in the long run.
The EU also helped create the hostile situation by launch-
ing legal proceedings against the eight CSI signatory states. 336
Customs specifically addressed this issue, noting its disap-
pointment with the EU's action. 337  The legal proceedings
aroused animosity of some member states as well. For example,
British seaport authorities accused the EU of taking legal action
in an attempt to take over the CSI. 338 Yet, in bringing litigation
against its member states, the Commission seeks to protect the
331. See supra notes 86-90, 94-106 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 86-106 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 94-106 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
335. See supra note 321 and accompanying text (noting that the United States
needed an immediate solution to address the deficiencies in its seaport security).
336. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
337. EU/US-Row Over Customs Security Agreements Hots Up, EUROPEAN
REPORT, Jan. 18, 2003, available at 2003 WL 10438650 (stating that "On January
14, U.S. Customs Commissioner Robert C. Bonner said it was 'disappointing' that
the European Commission was trying to annul agreements he had signed with sev-
eral EU Member States").
338. See Ports-Brussels and UK Set for Box Security Court Battle, LLOYD's LIST
INT'L, Jan. 20, 2003, available at 2003 WL 3047928 (noting that the U.K. feels the
Commission has overstepped its bounds by launching legal action to annul the bilat-
eral agreements).
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interests of the EU, and not to create an unnecessarily hostile
situation.
2. Workable Solutions
Bringing legal action in the Court of Justice may not be the
most desirable solution for the EU. Even if a favorable Court
decision annuls the existing bilateral agreements, the Court
proceedings are expected to take quite a long time. Since the
Community's main concern is to deter unfair competition and
trade distortion, 339 time may be of the essence. Thus, even if
annulling the bilateral agreements would give the EU more lev-
erage and probably better terms on a single agreement, the EU
should not sacrifice time. Furthermore, even if the EU is inter-
ested in obtaining the Court's interpretation on the Commu-
nity's rights over sea transport, 340 trade and competition con-
cerns may be more pressing. Therefore, maintaining legal
action to its fruition in the Court of Justice may not be the most
desirable solution, and the Commission may make better use of
its time by negotiating a CSI agreement with the United States.
Thus, the EU should let the bilateral agreements stand for
the moment. This will benefit the United States, the EU, and
world trade in general. The United States can keep its safety
procedures in place to protect itself and to prevent disruptions
to maritime trade. The EU benefits because the current CSI
seaports serve as a source where the EU can gather data and in-
formation to develop its plans for an EU-wide CSI agreement.
Because the EU is composed of many nations, the EU will re-
quire more time and planning to develop and coordinate a uni-
form trade protection program such as the CSI.341 Lastly, the
use of these figures to develop future solutions might be benefi-
cial for the entire CSI program and the international trade sys-
tem.
Nevertheless, the United States must do its part as well.
The United States must recognize that the increased operating
costs have produced a certain level of discontentment in the EU
trade community. 342 This feeling may have been aggravated by
the fact that the requirements of the CSI, the 24-hour manifest
rule, and C-TPAT are set fairly high and are difficult to satisfy.
339. See supra notes 117-18, 123-24 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
341. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
342. See generally supra notes 86-90, 94-106 and accompanying text.
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An ambitious program such as the CSI is not likely to operate at
its optimal level when its participants have inadequate funding
and increased expenses. A good solution would be to obtain
funding from the EU and the United States, but this may not be
practicable.
Thus, one possible solution may be to relax the require-
ments of the programs to a more realistic and feasible level.
Given the damage caused by the September 11th attacks, the
United States acted reasonably in instituting numerous safety
programs. But the EU trade community was suddenly subject
to Customs' new requirements with little or no adjustment pe-
riod. Beginning with lax requirements and progressively in-
creasing them throughout a prolonged time period would have
been ideal, but this was not possible. The United States can
find a middle ground by relaxing the rules to a point where the
programs are better aligned with the currently available funds
and the necessary expenses. As soon as the trade community is
able to manage the initial costs of meeting the safety standards,
Customs should be able to gradually increase the requirements
to the present standards, or even higher.
The United States does not necessarily sacrifice safety if
Customs strategically limits the requirements. For instance,
the United States may consider altering the 24-hour rule
slightly. Customs could shrink the twenty-four-hour window of
time by a few hours and apply the new window across the board
to all exporters. The better option may be to vary the time re-
quirement for different exporters. Thus, if the nature of a par-
ticular business is such that last minute additions to cargo are
frequent, Customs could cut back on the time requirements even
more for those businesses. Customs could separate the export-
ers into several categories, and assign different time require-
ments for each. Cutting back on the time requirements would
help the exporters quite a bit. And because shipments would
arrive at different times, there would be a more constant flow of
containers, which would solve the seaports' lack-of-space prob-
lems to some extent. However, Customs must increase the effi-
ciency of its operations to preserve the level of security. Cus-
toms can achieve this with increased cooperation with foreign
customs officials, faster analysis of available data, and develop-
ment of more efficient inspection procedures. Thus, strategi-
cally relaxing the current standards may help decrease the dis-
contentment of the businesses and could even prompt more
cooperation from the EU trade community.
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Finally, the ideal solution would be for the United States
and the EU to enter into a single multilateral CSI agreement as
soon as possible. Given the gravity and the urgency of the CSI
for the safety of the United States and the continuation of safe
international trade, both the United States and the EU must try
to cooperate in an expedient manner. The parties should be
willing to compromise. The EU could try to take into account
the safety concerns of the United States, and the United States
could be more willing to negotiate although it lacks a significant
incentive. Even though the EU must still follow Treaty proce-
dures, 343 which the United States may have initially feared
would take too long, this should not pose a substantial problem
anymore: the bilateral agreements are currently in place, and
they provide the United States with increased security meas-
ures. But at the same time, the EU should try to push this mat-
ter through the process faster, if possible.
Given the struggle between the United States' security con-
cerns on one hand and the EU's structure and interests on the
other, resolving differences may be difficult. Yet, under the cir-
cumstances, both parties must attempt to compromise and enter
into a mutually agreeable U.S.-EU CSI agreement. In the
meantime, the EU should allow the current bilateral agree-
ments to stand, and permit Customs to operate the programs in
place, and the United States should relax the 24-hour rule and
other requirements for now but compensate with more effi-
ciency.
CONCLUSION
The United States launched the CSI in its efforts to protect
U.S. seaports and maritime trade against threats of terrorism.
Due to the immediate need to secure the nation's seaports and
cargo containers headed for the United States, the United
States signed bilateral agreements only with select EU member
states-those whose seaports shipped the largest percentage of
cargoes to the United States.
Despite the United States' legitimate reasons for taking this
course of action, the bilateral agreements became the source of a
substantial conflict between the United States and the EU for
several reasons. First, EU laws mandate that the Commission
343. See supra notes 131-34, 159-61, 164-68 and accompanying text (detailing
the different procedures outlined under the CCP and the CFSP).
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is the proper party to carry out the CSI. The EU laws under the
EC Treaty and the TEU indicate that the EU has jurisdiction
over the CSI. Second, the CSI threatens to distort trade within
the EU and give a competitive advantage to the CSI seaports.
And third, the CSI and its companion programs-the 24-hour
rule and the C-TPAT-are projected to be very costly for the
trading community in the EU.
Consequently, the Court of Justice could rule in favor of the
Commission and nullify the bilateral agreements. However, in
the interests of U.S. security, global trade, and international
safety, the United States and the EU should agree on a single
CSI as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the EU should allow the
bilateral agreements to stand, and the United States should
strategically modify its trade protection programs and relax the
rules to a level better aligned with the available financial re-
sources.
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